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RULE 23: CHALLENGES TO THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS
EDWARD H. COOPER*
Three decadeshave elapsed since Rule 23 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
last underwent revision. Taking a cuefrom proposed amendmentspreparedby the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Professor Cooperasks whethernow is the appropriate time to revise Rule 23. In this Article he identifis three potential "big
changes" to the Rule. subsantially curtailing class actions; accommodating the
needs of mass-tort actions; and recognizing the class as an entity, distinct from Its
representatives. After outlining and critiquing the Advisory Committee's draf4
Professor Cooper raises a host of questions about many aspects of Rule 23 and
suggests that perhaps we do not know enough about the operation of the current
version of the Rule to undertake effective reform. Although he cautions against
revision of Rule 23 before we obtain answers to some of the questionsposed, Professor Cooperremains optimistic that the Rule can be improved in some ways without great cost.

INTRODUCTION

For some time now, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has
been studying the possibility of amending Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Following suggestions of an American Bar
Association Committee, a comprehensive draft was prepared during
* Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., 1961,
Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1964, Harvard University.
This paper was prepared to summarize many of the challenges that confront the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as it studies
Rule 23. Once a strong draft of a revised Rule 23 had been prepared, the Committee
undertook many activities to gather informal advice. This Symposium has been one of
those activities. This Symposium paper serves both internal and external purposes. The
external purpose is to continue the process of reaching outside the Committee for further
advice on the need and opportunities to revise Rule 23. The internal purpose is to provide
a starting point for further Committee deliberations, recognizing that the Committee will
continue to gather additional information and-if it concludes that the time has come to
pursue the revision process to the next step, a recommendation that the Standing Committee approve publication of a revised rule for public comment-will likely recommend a
draft rule that departs substantially from the draft described in this paper. Many of the
paper's assertions and questions blend comments that have been made to the Committee
or to individual Committee members, more or less formally, over a period of years. Footnotes to these assertions would be misleading even if they were possible. The research for
the Federal Judicial Center Study, referred to at intervals, was only half complete when this
paper was prepared. References to the completed study would weaken the quality of this
paper as an artifact of the Committee process midstream. So few plausible occasions for
citations remain that the Symposium editors have graciously agreed to defer to the author's vain desire to publish the paper as it was considered by the Committee, free of any
encumbering footnotes.
13
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the time when the Committee was chaired by Judge Sam Pointer.
Copies of two iterations of that draft are attached as appendices. It
seems fair to describe the draft as in many ways a modest revision that
would clean up many aspects of the Rule, and-through deliberately
flexible drafting-leave the way open for some measure of future
growth. By now, the draft has been reviewed informally by a goodly
number of practicing lawyers, judges, and academics. Reactions have
varied. The academics, and to some extent the judges, have viewed
the draft as indeed modest, a conservative but worthwhile effort to
improve some obvious rough spots that does not attempt to take on
the larger or more difficult questions. The practicing lawyers also
have tended to view the draft as modest, but believe that the cost of
adoption would far exceed the possible benefits. In their eyes, it has
taken nearly three decades to beat Rule 23 into a workable instrument, an achievement that would be set back at least a decade if they
were given the chance to litigate and strategize about the proposed
changes.
These mixed reactions point up the questions that, in the end, are
most important: Has the time come to attempt any changes in Rule
23? If so, what-and how dramatic-should they be?
Even this articulation of the questions assumes that it is appropriate to study Rule 23 with an eye to possible improvement. That assumption, at least, seems sound. The unspoken barrier that shielded
Rule 23 from Enabling Act scrutiny for many years has come down.
Rule 23 was last revised in 1966. The 1966 version of the Rule has
taken on a life that would have astonished the Advisory Committee.
Answers have been given to many questions that were not, could not,
have been foreseen. A comprehensive review of this experience is
now appropriate. It would be astonishing if this review were to show
that we have, by a common-law process of elaborating Rule 23, developed an ideal class action procedure. Surely there is room, both here
and there, to improve the Rule.
The conclusion that this is an appropriate time to study Rule 23
does not mean that this is an appropriate time to change Rule 23.
Improvement carries its own costs as lawyers and judges struggle to
understand, implement, amplify, and take strategic advantage of the
intended changes. And if there is room to improve, there also is room
to confuse, weaken, or even do great harm. Perhaps more to the
point, seizing the opportunity to make modest improvements today
will surely mean that Rule 23 will not be revisited for many years. If
more significant or better improvements might be made in five years,
or ten, it likely would be better to defer present action. There is no
imperative to act once a problem is studied, no shame in inaction.
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Much depends on the state of present knowledge and the quality of
present foresight. Foresight is particularly important, not only in developing wise answers, but also in drafting them into a Rule that will
deliver those answers in the face of determined attempts by adversary
lawyers to wrest different answers from it.
A question framed in this way cannot be answered without also
determining the measure of risk aversion appropriate to the Enabling
Act process. The rulemaking process works best when it generalizes
the lessons of actual experience in a smaller arena. That comforting
security, however, is not always available. Rule 23 might never be
amended if first we must have controlled experiments, or clear empirical measurement of actual local experience with a new provision. The
Enabling Act process has often relied successfully on less rigorous evidence. The aggregated experience of all of those engaged in the formal rulemaking process, as well as the many insights provided by
public comment and less formal processes such as this Symposium,
can provide a secure foundation. But judgments can and do differ
about the lessons of experience. There are seldom likely to be
changes to any rule that do not encounter some risk, however small
the rule and the changes may seem. Some risks are properly accepted.
If there is a clear problem and no experience-tested solution, real risks
may justifiably be run. If there is no clear problem, an esthetic desire
to pretty up a rule does not justify any significant risk. The urgency of
the need is as important an element as the state of knowledge and
quality of foresight.
In many ways, the pending reconsideration of Rule 23 provides a
good test of the Enabling Act process. If the process can operate only
when there are rigorous and clear answers to the important questions
about present experience, Rule 23 must remain out of reach. If the
process also requires rigorous and clear predictions as to the effects of
any changes, Rule 23 is even further beyond our reach. Prediction of
the effects of a new rule in comparison to continued judicial evolution
of the present rule, to development of other possible methods of aggregation, or to individual litigation, never will be precise. And it is
simply impossible to reckon with such questions as the possible impact
of new court rules in encouraging or discouraging procedural or substantive lawmaking by Congress or state legislatures.
As if these questions were not difficult enough, consideration
should extend beyond the federal courts. State courts too are in the
class action business, and many are likely to adapt their rules to the
federal rules. It is proper at least to consider the experience of state
courts, and to attempt to draft a rule that recognizes the role of statelaw claims not only in federal court but also in state courts.
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The final caution is that there always is a temptation to do more
than really should be done by rule. Even if firm answers can be found
for all the questions, large and small, it is better to avoid complicating
the rule with answers to all the small questions. Once the framework
is established, judicial evolution may provide good-perhaps betteranswers, and can be better than the formal rulemaking process at
adapting the answers to changing needs. The Manual for Complex
Litigation enjoys similar advantages in helping to shape developing
practice.
As to Rule 23, my own mood at the moment is one of optimistic
caution. The caution arises from the staggering array of questions
without clear answers. Many of these questions are described below.
Caution also arises from the dramatic new uses of Rule 23 in dispersed mass-injury cases. In that field, a perfect grasp of today's reality would be superseded before it could be captured in a clear rule.
The optimism arises from the belief that there are some ways at least
in which Rule 23 can be improved without great cost. The optimism
also is the shiny back side of a darker view that it will be at least ten
years before we know enough to be able to undertake more sweeping
changes within the confines of the Rules Enabling Act process.
I
BIG CHANGES

There are two obvious occasions for making potentially big
changes to Rule 23, one negative-from the perspective of class action
fans-and one positive. The negative changes would seek substantial
curtailment of class action practice. The positive changes would seek
to capture and perhaps improve the growing efforts to adapt the present Rule to the needs of dispersed mass injuries. There also may be
room for a third and essentially conceptual change, perhaps not so big
but potentially important. This change would recognize openly that
the class-amorphous, defined in the end only by judicial fiat-is an
entity apart from those who volunteer (or may be coerced) to speak
for it. It is, to be sure, a juridically created entity, and must speak
through people just as a corporation must speak through people. But
it may help to sharpen the focus on class-as-client, speaking through
one set of agents to another. These possible changes are addressed at
the outset, before turning to the more detailed, even niggling questions that may be addressed whatever is done about the larger issues.
The big changes will be described in terms that reflect assumptions
about current experience that are widely shared but unreliable. One
of the most important tasks is to learn more about the realities that
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underlie these and other assumptions, a task that the Federal Judicial
Center is attempting. Reality may be different from perception, and
perhaps markedly different. But large questions may provoke more
diligent inquiry into reality, and thereby serve a purpose even if the
questions prove irrelevant in the real world.
A.

Cutting Back on Rule 23

Virtually all of the current discussion assumes that there is little
need even to tinker with the core of (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. This
tacit assumption is hardly surprising. There may be room to change
such incidents as notice and the opportunity to opt out. Creation of
an opportunity to opt out would provide an indirect means of addressing the conflicts among individual members of the groups that, because of similarities that at times may be only superficial, are assumed
to constitute homogeneous classes. But there is no perceived need to
rethink the justification for these classes. To the contrary, it is widely
assumed that (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes represent the traditional and
persistently legitimate core of Rule 23. They also account for a relatively small minority of all class actions.
It may be surprising, on the other hand, that there have been few
suggestions that the time has come to rethink the public-enforcement
function of (b)(3) classes. It is commonly accepted that (b)(3) classes,
by providing a means for aggregating small claims that would not bear
the cost of individual enforcement, have significantly expanded the
effective reach of many substantive principles. This effect is not beyond examination, both to assess whether it is as pervasive as some
observers assert and to determine whether it is desirable. Because the
question is not at the front of discussion, it deserves only brief and
preliminary expansion.
One consequence of (b)(3) classes can be likened to the "freeway
effect." One lesson from the early years of urban freeway construction was that pre-freeway traffic volumes expanded quickly as freeways were opened. Given an opportunity for more convenient
driving, more people drove more places. The same consequence flows
from procedural devices that aggregate small claims into more convenient litigating units. This effect obviously touches the aggregation
court as claims that otherwise would be filed elsewhere are brought to
the aggregation court. It is widely believed that beyond this reallocation of business among courts, aggregation also increases the number
of claims that are made in any court. It cannot be assumed that the
result always is "more justice," even accepting the underlying substantive rules at full value. One obvious risk is that defeat of aggregated
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claims will obliterate many claims that would have been justly vindicated in individual actions. That this risk is seldom discussed reflects
the realistic assumption-of which more later-that aggregation creates a nearly irresistible force to award something to the claimants.
Another risk is found in the common cynical observation that individual actions may be brought on ten or twenty percent of valid claims,
while aggregated actions may be brought on one hundred and twenty
percent of valid claims. Creating aggregating mechanisms that accurately sort out the unfounded individual claims may reduce the value
of aggregation substantially.
A more troubling concern is that many of our substantive rules
are tolerable only so long as they are not fully enforced. One version
of this concern is that full enforcement simply costs more than it is
worth. One illustration, not fanciful, is provided by the class action to
recover on behalf of consumers who had been duped into buying recorded music "performed" by a group that lip-synched to a performance by other artists. Putting aside any lingering doubts about the
nature of the injury, great cost is incurred in mounting the action, supervising it, possibly deciding it on the merits should settlement fail,
and distributing relief. It is a real question whether the cost is justified
by the individual benefits of the actual award, or the aggregate benefits from deterring similar behavior. In some settings, these costs can
be reduced by finding substitute means of relief. For example, the
offending musicians stage a free concert or reduce the price for the
next record they actually perform themselves (if anyone will buy it),
or a monetary recovery is awarded to a plausibly relevant charity.
Whatever ingenuity might devise by way of "fluid," "cy pres," or
"class" recoveries, they present a question that can be articulated in at
least two ways. The direct mode is to ask whether such dispersed benefits stray too far from the connection that justifies imposing private
remedies for private wrongs. The more diffuse mode is to ask whether
all substantive principles really merit pervasive enforcement. Many of
our substantive principles are tolerable only if they are not fully enforced. (I do not offer any examples because each of my examples
would offend some, whose counterexamples might at times offend
me.)
One response to this question would be to inquire whether three
decades of experience with broad enforcement of at least some substantive rules through (b)(3) class actions justifies significant retrenchment. The absence of any suggestion that this inquiry should be
undertaken may reflect general satisfaction with Rule 23 as a private
enforcement means for public values. Surely there are many who do
feel satisfied. Perhaps even those who are not satisfied prefer
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continuing evolution in the courts to the risks of revision in the
rulemaking process. However that may be, the rulemaking process
faces a separate problem. Specifically, Rule 23 has grown into a device with sweeping substantive consequences. Substantive consequences flow from good procedure as well as bad; it is not a ground
for shrinking from a procedural improvement that it will facilitate
more thorough enforcement of substantive principles. It is too late to
argue that the 1966 creation of present Rule 23(b)(3) is invalid because of its profound substantive impact. But it would be different to
cut back on Rule 23(b)(3) because of concern that it leads to overenforcement of substantive rules. Revising Rule 23 to cut back its
substantive consequences may be as much within the Enabling Act as
its original adoption and subsequent amendment, but the motive
would be perceived-and correctly so-as a desire to abridge substantive rights as they are now enjoyed. It may seem a paradox, but use of
the Enabling Act process to correct its own excesses, even unanticipated excesses, is fraught with real controversy.
Two relatively modest steps might be taken toward cabining the
substantive effects of Rule 23. One, by far the simpler, would be to
permit consideration of the balance between the need for private enforcement of public values through Rule 23 and the costs of the proceeding. A court might be permitted to conclude that regardless of
the merits, certification is inappropriate in light of the effort required
to superintend the litigation, the trivial nature of individual benefits,
and the insignificant character of the alleged wrong. Using a term
perhaps not appropriate for the language of a formal court rule, this
approach would enable a court to refuse certification because a class
action "just ain't worth it." Certification could be denied even on the
assumption that the class has a strong claim on the merits.
The second limiting approach, in some ways related to the first
approach, would be to undo present doctrine and permit or require
preliminary consideration of the probable outcome on the merits.
Although motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment are more effective than many have thought in defeating suits brought as class actions, weak-and perhaps very weakclaims can survive such preliminary challenges. Certification of a
claim that is likely to fail on the merits may consume an unwarranted
share of scarce judicial resources. More important, certification of a
weak claim can exert a strong pressure to settle to avoid the costs of
defending a class action and even create a small risk of losing a large
judgment.
It is tempting to analogize preliminary consideration of the merits
to the approach taken in deciding whether to issue a preliminary in-
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junction. The comfort provided by this analogy unfortunately proves
illusory on examination. This should be no surprise, because the function of the inquiry differs in the two settings. The primary objective of
a preliminary injunction is to preserve the opportunity to grant effective relief after trial-to preserve a meaningful opportunity to resolve
the claim on the merits. The primary objective of refusing certification for class pursuit of claims that do not bear the freight of individual litigation is to protect against the burdens and corresponding
pressures of class action litigation. This difference affects each of the
four factors in the familiar injunction formula: (1) the threshold
probability of success; (2) the harm of denying relief; (3) the harm of
granting relief; and (4) the public interest.
There is no reason to suppose that the threshold probability of
success on the merits should be measured in the same way in the two
settings. At the outset, the preliminary injunction question is likely to
be addressed at the beginning of the litigation on the basis of procedures affected by the need for promptness; more deliberate procedures, often including controlled discovery, are likely to be available
in addressing the class-certification question. More important, the required level of probability is likely to fluctuate around a lower point in
the class-certification setting, particularly when it seems highly probable that individual claims never will be resolved on the merits absent
certification. Reducing the required probability of success also seems
justified by the differences in consequences between class certification
and preliminary relief, as reflected in the remaining three factors.
The harm of denying relief must be measured in the class setting
more by appraising the merits of the class claim than by the real-world
impact of ongoing conduct that might be controlled by injunction. It
also is possible to develop a test that considers not only the prospect
of class success but also the importance of class success, akin to the
first suggestion. If little individual harm is done by denying relief, a
relatively strong prospect of success might be demanded.
The harm of granting relief must be measured in the class setting
by the burdens of the class-litigation process and the pressure to settle
out of the litigation burdens, again not by the real-world impact of
controlling primary human activity. The importance of class success
affects this assessment inseparably from the assessment of the harm of
denying class relief.
The public interest, finally, must play a far larger role in classcertification determinations than ordinarily occurs with preliminary
injunction decisions. Class actions that aggregate small claims that
cannot effectively be enforced one-by-one are more important as a
means of vindicating and enforcing the underlying public purposes of
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regulating legal rules than as a means of providing often trivial relief
to individual claimants. Perhaps because it is so important, measurement of the public interest must begin with the question whether it is
proper for courts to distinguish-or, in a less flattering word, discriminate-between the levels of public importance represented by different underlying legal rules and by different asserted violations of those
rules.
No real comfort can be found in the preliminary injunction analogy. The suggestion that class certification should be affected by a
preliminary look at the merits also must reckon with the collateral
consequences of taking a look. The time for making the certification
decision, for example, is likely to be postponed in order to provide an
adequate basis for going beyond the showings required on motion to
dismiss. Often it may be possible to rely on a summary judgment record for the conclusion that although summary judgment is not warranted, the case is so thin that class certification can be denied. But at
other times a summary judgment motion may focus on only some
parts of the case, leaving the need for more global exploration and
appraisal. If a significant prospect of success is required, it may be
appropriate to reconsider the question of whether a defendant should
bear some part of the costs of notifying a plaintiff class. The proposal
to create an opportunity for permissive interlocutory appeal from
class-certification decisions is another example-if appraisal of the
merits affects the certification decision, the nature of the appeal will
be changed, the probable delay increases, and the court of appeals
must wrestle with the prospect that permitting appeal will embroil it in
consideration of issues that will reappear on a later appeal. Many
other effects are likely to emerge, some that can be foreseen with diligent imagination and others that are beyond our powers of prediction.
Either of these proposals for cutting back on Rule 23(b)(3) may
be challenged as inviting improper judicial discrimination among favored and disfavored substantive principles. An unadorned provision
allowing consideration of the probable outcome on the merits would
be least subject to this charge, but would not be immune. Consideration of the probable outcome has strong attractions nonetheless. The
simplest form would add probable outcome on the merits as one of
the factors to be considered with all other factors in deciding on certification. Whether in this simple form or some more complex variation, much good might be done in protecting against the riskhowever symbolic or real-that weak claims can impose heavy burdens and, through the burdens, coerce unjust settlements.
The mood of the moment, at any rate, seems to be that Rule 23
should not be cut back significantly. At most, some support might be
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found for permitting consideration of the probable merits of the class
claim. The question is whether the Rule should be expanded, or at
least made to work more effectively within its present sphere.
B. Mass Torts
A great deal of attention is being focused on "mass torts," carefully distinguishing between "single-event" cases and those that arise
out of more dispersed injuries. The single-event cases are exemplified
by hotel fires, airplane crashes, bridge collapses, and other circumstances in which a concluded transaction has generated a known and
identifiable universe of claimants. The dispersed injuries are exemplified by environmental contamination and product injuries-most
prominently asbestos-in which a prolonged course of conduct produces effects that may span periods of years or even decades, generating unknown and perhaps unpredictable numbers of claimants who
suffer a wide variety of injuries that range from trifling to serious or
fatal. Whether or not the consequences of such events are well-suited
to resolution through any variation of our adversary judicial process,
courts have had to cope with them. The starting point has been traditional enough: as compared to the small claims that will not bear the
costs of individual litigation, mass torts give rise to large numbers of
individual actions. The questions arise from efforts to reduce the staggering costs of proceeding case-by-case, costs that include not only
transaction costs but the inconsistent treatment of claimants who, on
any rational ground, should be treated consistently. Many ingenious
efforts have been made, often outside Rule 23, at times within the
scope of Rule 23, and at times nominally within the scope of Rule 23
but well beyond the reach that anyone would have imagined until two
or three years ago.
The mass-tort phenomenon provides a particularly inviting opportunity for creative rulemaking. In broad terms, the question is
whether we can invent an aggregating procedure that, as compared to
present procedures, affords better net results to most claimants than
now flow from individualized litigation. Many lawyers would say that
present practices have not achieved this goal; that, given a choice, an
individual whose claim is sufficient to support individualized litigation
usually is better off opting out of an aggregated proceeding. It would
be a stunning triumph to develop a procedure that supersedes this
judgment. The triumph would be stunning, however, because the difficulties are so great. Perhaps three groups of these difficulties merit
attention: (1) lack of knowledge; (2) limits of the Enabling Act process; and (3) intrinsic limits of judicial procedure.
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Lack of Knowledge

Lack of knowledge needs the least emphasis. We are in the infant
stages of aggregating mass-tort litigation. Many different approaches
are being tried. The wisdom and long-run success of these improvisations cannot be measured for years to come. The only thing that can
be said with confidence is that some approaches are dispatching cases.
The most recent and dramatic examples seek to resolve tens of
thousands of cases and incipient cases through class-based settlements
that are driven by the defendants' needs to buy "global peace" against
(almost) all claimants, both those who have been injured in the past
and those-"futures" claimants-who have not yet been injured. Dispatching cases, and on a reasonably uniform basis, is a great virtue.
But the most dramatic approaches also are the most improvisatory.
They also veer furthest from traditional judicial methods and closest
to administrative systems. In one variation or another they are being
applied to problems that are similar only in presenting large numbers
of claims. Some settings have matured in the senses that the facts are
(or seem to be) fully developed, the law is clear, and there is substantial experience with individual litigation that demonstrates the realistic strategic value of individual claims. Asbestos litigation is often
offered as an example. Some settings may generate the particularly
difficult questions of marshalling limited assets to meet competing
present and future claims. Again, asbestos litigation provides a familiar example. Other settings have none of these characteristics. And
no setting leaves us near the point of understanding evaluation.
It is confounding, for example, to contemplate the question of
"maturity." The nature of dispersed torts virtually forecloses aggregation before some individual actions have been tried. If the plaintiffs
should win all of a substantial number of individual actions, an aggregated adjudication that establishes liability seems sensible if courts
should shy away from nonmutual issue preclusion. This approach becomes more troubling as the proportion of defense victories increases,
and becomes more troubling in a complicated way. An aggregated
once-and-for-all adjudication is not attractive at the other end of the
spectrum, where plaintiffs should lose all of the same substantial
number of individual actions. If the aggregated litigation should impose liability in favor of all remaining class members, we would be
troubled by doubts as to the correctness of the result, and troubled
also by the prospect that the earlier losers should remain without redress when many others are compensated through the class adjudication. Our doubts as to the correctness of the result might well be
enhanced by fear that the unnerving prospect of denying all recovery
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to every plaintiff may itself exert significant pressure to impose liability. And the alternative of a settlement that in effect establishes partial liability does not gladden all hearts. As much as we value private
peacemaking, the compromise may reflect either the overwhelming
power of the defendant to defeat claimants in one-on-one litigation or
the overwhelming power of class litigation to coerce capitulation.
Surely the outcomes of individual actions that have been tried to judgment should be considered in determining whether and how to aggregate remaining claims; the means of weighing this factor, however,
cannot be easily described.
2. Limits of the EnablingAct Process
The limits of the Enabling Act are equally obvious. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot directly affect the subject-matter jurisdiction limits that may impede thorough-going aggregation in federal courts. Indirect effects might be possible, most likely through
clarifying the conceptual character of class litigation, but this prospect
is uncertain at best. There may be greater hope for addressing questions of personal jurisdiction, subject only to Fifth Amendment due
process constraints; Rule 4(k)(2) may provide reassurance on this
score. The Rules cannot do anything directly about the choice-of-law
problems that beset aggregation, particularly through class actions.
Indirect effects may be more plausible in this area, by such devices as
opt-in classes for those who agree to abide by a specified choice of
law, or narrow issues classes that seek to resolve fact issues or lowestcommon-denominator issues of law application. Such indirect effects
may help, but they fall far short of giving coherent focus to the traditional forces that generate widely disparate consequences, state by
state, for a common course of activity pursued on a regional or national level. One approach may be to attempt a closer integration of
the Enabling Act process with Congress, working toward simultaneous solutions in which new rules and new legislation follow parallel
paths. Any such approach must be undertaken with great care, however, lest the great virtues of Enabling Act independence be gradually
diminished.
3. Intrinsic Limits of Judicial Procedure
The intrinsic limits of judicial process require reflection on what
can be and on what ought to be. What is possible depends not only on
procedure but also on structure: It would be possible to provide
prompt individual trials by traditional procedures to all asbestos
claimants, for example, if only there were enough judges-and law-
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yers-to handle them. Fewer lawyers and judges would be needed if
common liability issues were resolved by preclusion, whether arising
from a global class determination, nonmutual preclusion based on individual litigation, consent to "bellwether" litigation, or some other
means. To note this possibility is not to champion it, even as an abstract possibility. In fact, no government is going to assume the direct
costs, quite apart from a lingering wonder about the uses to be found
for all those lawyers and judges, when the asbestos cases are cleaned
up. More important for our purposes, traditional adjudication of such
a mass of cases may not be desirable at all. If liability remains open in
each case, there will be inconsistent determinations of liability-very
few as time goes on, but some nonetheless. Even if liability is taken as
established, like injuries will win dramatically different awards. We
live with the inconsistencies and irrationalities that are inevitable in
our system when they occur on small levels of low visibility. It is more
difficult to accept them on a large and highly visible scale.
In the real world, individual litigation of all asbestos claims wH
not occur. If they are to be decided by courts, as they must be for
want of any alternative, some expediting device must be found. Aggregation seems to be the answer, whether it is as modest as joint trial
of ten or twelve cases at a time; as imaginative as projection of a selected sample of damages verdicts to a universe of claimants; or as
ambitious as class-based settlement of tens of thousands of cases at
one time. These and other aggregating devices share the virtues not
only of saving costs but also of promoting consistent outcomes. They
also reduce or eliminate individual control of individual litigating
destiny and move courts away from the traditional roles that give reassurance of legitimacy. In the more dramatic forms, they may involve
courts in relatively remote supervision of administrative tasks and
structures such as claims-resolution facilities that bear scant resemblance to traditional adjudication. The departure from traditional
structures and procedures reflects a carefully considered judgment
that new means must be found to meet new needs, but the departure
remains substantial.
Volumes have been written about mass-tort litigation, and whole
shelves will be filled. Every branch of the bench and bar is contributing. The question for the rulemaking process is whether the successful
beginnings can be identified and captured in a few hundred words that
consolidate the good, discard the weak, and above all provide the flexibility needed for future growth. It is not particularly important
whether the words are placed in Rule 23 or in some new "Rule 23.3."
But it is vitally important to know where to start. The most cautious
approach is that embodied in the current draft. The draft includes an
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increased emphasis on issues classes, and creates opt-in classes as well
as expanded opportunities for opting out or defeating any opting out.
These features were deliberately designed to support further development of Rule 23 in mass-tort cases without attempting to predict the
direction or extent of the development. A bolder approach may be
justified, but the information base must be secure.
C. Class As Entity and Client
Rule 23 requires that a class be represented by a "member" of
the class whose claims or defenses are "typical" and who will "fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." Courts rightly seek
to ensure adequate representation. Representation, however, can be
provided by counsel. The role of the member-representative is more
ambivalent. At times courts seem to want member-representatives
who can fulfill the role of sophisticated client, exercising a wise and
restraining judgment. At other times courts seem more concerned
with the member-representative as a token, offered up to appease
memories of a superseded client-adversary model that lingers only in
tradition and the formal trappings of Rule 23(a). Representatives
with no significant stake and no plausible understanding of the litigation may be accepted with good cheer. Nowhere is the ambiguity
more obvious than in the decisions that recognize continued representation by a class member whose individual claim has been mooted.
The questions that surround the individual representative are reflected in recent congressional attempts to revise class action procedures for claims under the securities laws. One proposal would have
required appointment of a guardian for the class; another would have
required appointment of a steering committee of class members with
very substantial individual stakes. These proposals evidently spring
from a fear that there are no real clients in these actions, and-the
important point-that the system suffers for the lack.
Class representation could be sought in many quarters. Many different forms of public representation are possible; none seems a likely
candidate for adoption by amending Rule 23. The familiar alternatives include class members, organizations that represent group interests more than individuals, and class counsel.
The difficulties that surround class representation by a class member vary across a broad range, reflecting the broad range of class actions. When challenged acts have inflicted relatively trifling injury on
many people, there is little incentive for an individual class member to
devote any significant time or energy, much less money, to the common cause; if member-representatives are not literally hard to find,
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the likely reason is that counsel who find representatives assure them
that they need not really bother with things. Or perhaps other rewards for the representatives are involved. When significant numbers
of people have suffered individual injuries that would support individual litigation, the problems are quite different. There are likely to be
conflicts of interest, more or less acute, beginning with selection of the
forum, definition of the class, choice of counsel, setting the goals of
litigation, and so straight on to the end. These conflicts run almost
indifferently among class members, representative class members, and
counsel. Resolution is most likely to be effected by counsel, at times
explicitly but often implicitly, in the course of making tactical decisions. Quite different problems may be involved with "institutional
reform" litigation. An employment-discrimination class, for example,
may include people of divergent interests and beliefs; representative
members may not be aware of the divergences, or may prefer to present the image of a homogeneous class.
Organizations that maintain class actions behind the facade of individual representatives often provide highly effective representation,
driven by commitment to lofty ideals and fueled by experience and
sophistication. There is a risk, however, that ideological commitment
may create as much conflict with the views and interests of class members as ever arises from divergences among class members themselves.
There is little reason to believe that all problems disappear when an
interest group assumes the role of client.
Class counsel often enough provide the originating genius of class
actions. Very often they are the only source of informed, sophisticated judgment about the goals to be pursued, and in all but the exceptional case they must choose the means of pursuit. In most cases,
effective representation will be provided by counsel, without substantial let or hindrance, or it will not be provided at all. Adverse reactions to this phenomenon arise from an array of concerns. A familiar
concern is that class counsel in fact are the class: they seek out token
representatives, pursue the class claim primarily for the sake of fees,
and measure success by their own fees rather than class relief. A
somewhat different concern is that ideologically driven counsel may
persist in pursuing imagined class goals far beyond the point of optimum class benefit. In greater extremes, there may be a concern that
nearly frivolous claims are pursued for nuisance or strike value, without any thought of class benefit.
These tensions surrounding adequate representation will not be
resolved by any likely revision of Rule 23. Some help might be found,
however, in subtle changes that focus on the class more and the member-representatives less. One direct approach would be to focus di-

HeinOnline -- 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 27 1996

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:13

rectly on representation of class interests, considering the involvement
of class members as simply one factor bearing on adequacy. The class
would be regarded as the client, and adequate representation by counsel as the test. The greatest virtue of this approach may be derided as
little more than esthetic-it would greatly reduce the unseemly spectacle of recruiting representatives who know little or nothing of the
dispute and are no more than token clients. But esthetics count for
something; the cynicism that readily surrounds representative class
members can taint the occasional genuinely representative member.
More important, this common sham can exert a gradual corrosive effect that weakens more significant constraints on the behavior of
counsel. Beyond the esthetics, focus on the class as the client might
improve our approach to other problems. Mootness doctrine could
focus solely on the life and death of the class claim, without the complicated doctrines that permit certification to relate back to the time
before the individual representative's claim became moot, continued
representation by a mooted representative, and the like that now
cloud the picture. Discarding the image of the representative's claims
as typical might encourage a more direct focus on the definition of the
class and on the conflicts that may require multiple classes or subclasses. And courts would become more obviously responsible for ensuring adequate representation.
The entity concept of the class might afford one useful perspective for addressing the question of whether class counsel also should
represent individual class members. At least when individual class
members have claims that would support individual litigation, there is
a risk that duties to an individual client and prospects of personal attorney advantage may conflict with duties to the class. Even if individual claims would not support individual litigation, a risk of conflict
arises if class representatives are allowed compensation for the effort
devoted to pursuing the class claim. If the class is seen as a separate
client, these questions can be addressed more thoughtfully.
Quite different advantages might flow from treating the class as
an entity in dealing with questions of jurisdiction. A Rule 23 amendment that defined the class as an entity might of itself be sufficient to
establish the class claim as the measure of the amount in controversy
required for diversity jurisdiction. A rather neat intellectual trick
would be required, justifying interpretation of the amount-incontroversy requirement as a means of identifying the cases suitable
for federal adjudication by the total amount involved and the importance of the defendant's stake, while simultaneously continuing to
permit focus on individual representatives to avoid the frequently disabling impact of the complete diversity requirement.
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Focus on the class-as-client also might influence thinking about
due-process constraints on exposing individual claimants to adjudication in a distant forum having no apparent contact with their individual claims. Connections to the interrelated events underlying all
claims can be viewed as connections to the class, and membership in
the litigating class as itself a tie to the forum. Jurisdictional concepts
are thoroughly-and often foolishly-conceptualistic. Providing a
clear concept is proper business for the Enabling Act process.
Really imaginative use of the entity concept might even support a
more rational approach to choice of law. Viewing a class of victims as
a whole, it is very difficult to understand why different people should
win or lose, or win more or less, because different sources of law are
chosen to govern the self-same conduct. If it were possible to imagine
a class claim, it would be possible to choose a single law to govern the
single claim, or-more likely-to choose a single law to govern the
claim as to each defendant. It need not matter which variation of
choice-of-law theory is selected after that point. As attractive as this
prospect might seem to a true heretic, it probably reaches too far for
present acceptance. It is too easy to argue that class certification can
do no more than take individual claims as they exist in the nature of
individual choice-of-law processes, however much those processes depend on the choice of forum. As a mere procedural device, class
treatment cannot alter the conceptual substance of the individual
claim, no matter how drastically the claim is affected in fact. Separate
-sovereignties account for the unseemly differences in outcome, and
their interests cannot be thwarted by this trick.
Coming closer to the end of the litigation, evaluation of the adequacy of a proposed class settlement at times requires treating the
class as an entity. When the class aggregates small claims that have no
practical value as the subject of individual actions, reference to the
size of individual claims cannot provide a meaningful measure.
Whether the purpose of aggregation is seen as providing an effective
individual remedy that otherwise would not exist, or-more realistically-enforcing important social policies, the settlement can be appraised only in relation to the total, as well as the strength, of the
aggregated claims.
Entity treatment also might help in confronting the preclusion
consequences of a class action judgment. In one direction, it would
underscore the proposition that the claim pursued by the class often is
narrower than the claim that would be defined for purposes of individual litigation. Although an individual would, for example, be expected to join statutory discrimination and contract theories in a
single action for wrongful termination, a class action for discrimina-
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tion often should leave the way clear for an individual contract action.
This benefit could become particularly important in settings that involve many claimants with small damages and a few with large damages growing out of the same setting. Illustrations are offered by the
purchasers of defectively designed motor vehicles. Many will have
relatively small claims based on depreciated value; a few will have
large claims based on personal injury. It is unthinkable that either
settlement or litigated judgment in a class action on behalf of all
should preclude individual actions by those who suffer personal injuries, either before or after the class judgment. Recognizing that the
class claim is limited to the common injury would help to express and
ensure this conclusion.
Matters are more confused in another direction. Class actions
may augment the risks of litigation that is premature in relation to
advancing knowledge. A claim on behalf of millions of users of an
over-the-counter drug might be brought and fail because of inability
to prove that the drug causes a particular side-effect. Ten years later,
convincing proof might become available, and be most convincing as
to users who were members of the original class. We are prepared to
accept preclusion in individual cases that present this problem. It is
not clear whether we should be prepared to accept preclusion by representation on such a grand scale. Open recognition of the distinctive
character of class litigation would at least frame the question for direct
investigation and response.
Attempts to pursue overlapping or successive class actions are
less likely to yield to an entity vision of the class, but some progress
might be made even in this direction. Certification of a class in one
court could be found to engage the class claim, invoking the rules that
are appropriate when two or more actions are brought by the same
plaintiff on the same claim. Courts are often surprisingly willing to
allow two actions to proceed on parallel tracks, however, and it may
be unduly optimistic to hope that a different approach would be taken
when different representatives presume to voluntarily submit the
same class claim to different courts. Successive attempts to certify a
class after failing in one action may prove even more difficult to control. It would be convenient to argue that the asserted class is bound
by the determination that it does not exist, but the seeming selfcontradiction will be difficult to accept. The initial refusal to recognize the class as an entity seems to leave no one to be bound when a
different putative representative appears with a second request for
recognition.
Entity treatment of the class also could provide the paradoxical
benefit of encouraging more careful thought about the individuals
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who constitute the class. Because the entity is obviously artificial, its
separation makes it more difficult to pretend that the class is its members. Greater care may be taken in addressing questions of class
membership and conflicts of interest, and in considering whether to
frame the action as a mandatory, opt-out, or opt-in class. The sharp
distinction between the class as an entity and its constituting members,
moreover, may underscore the need to think clearly about the members' rights to participate both individually and ihrough influence on
class counsel.
Increasing judicial responsibility for adequate class representation may be the most important single reason for rejecting a change
that would define the class as the client. Although courts now are
responsible for policing adequacy, treating the class as an entity would
make it clear that this responsibility is not shared with any particular
class representative. It also would be clear that the representatives
cannot be relied upon to make the initial selection of counsel (or, perhaps more realistically, to ratify self-selection by counsel who sought
them out). At the outset, courts would be more responsible for the
identity of counsel. There is no reason to allow class counsel to be
selected by the first representative who appears, much less by a representative recruited by would-be class counsel. At a minimum, the
court could be required to give notice of any action seeking class certification and to invite competing applications to appear as counsel for
the class. As exciting as it may be to contemplate such devices as
auctioning the opportunity to represent the class, judicial responsibility for selecting counsel for one of the adversaries makes substantial
inroads on a system that relies on the court to remain impartial between adversaries who appear before it on their own motion. Even
more troubling, courts would remain responsible throughout the litigation, taking on a role that necessarily involves particular consideration of the interests and position of one party. Maintaining a
distinction between neutral assurance of adequate representation and
acting as guardian of class interests must be difficult, and perhaps not
fully possible. The token class member representative may not do
much to assure adequate representation, and courts now are responsible for assuring adequate representation, but the change could be
troubling nonetheless.
If focus on the class-as-client might have esthetic advantages,
moreover, it also might have symbolic disadvantages. We can pretend
that class member representatives are clients. It is more difficult to
pretend that a class is a real client. Cries of barratry, champerty, and
maintenance-or the more contemporary buccaneering-would
redouble.
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And of course the urge to focus on the class-as-client provides
another illustration of generalizing from one or two class action phenomena. The need for a client is most real in cases that aggregate
large numbers of small claims and do not win the involvement of any
class members with substantial stakes. Entity treatment may seem
most promising in such cases. Yet it is possible-although just
barely-that in fact named representatives often monitor counsel in
genuine and important ways, a proposition that will be almost impossible to disprove by any readily available means of empirical research.
The problems that arise from actions brought by organizations that
may not speak for the purported class are quite different, while the
problems that arise from aggregation of large numbers of substantial
individual claims are of a still different order. For that matter, defendant classes should not be overlooked. The idea of suing a class without naming at least one real defendant-representative is not plausible.
II
THE CURRENT DRAFT

A.

An Outline

This is not the occasion for a detailed review of the current Rule
23 draft. In broadest terms, it would make three major changes in
present practice. First, the present line between mandatory classes
and opt-out classes would be blurred by empowering the court to permit opting out from any class, to deny opting out from any class, or to
certify an opt-in class. Second, notice provisions would be generalized, explicitly requiring notice in all class actions but relaxing to
some extent the strict requirements now exacted in (b)(3) classes.
And third, the present opportunities for certifying subclasses and "issues" classes would be emphasized. These changes inevitably blur the
sharp differences in consequence that have flowed from the choice
among (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) classes. They need not necessarily
blur the conceptual differences between these categories of classes; it
is possible to craft a rule that allows opting out of a (b)(1) class, that
explicitly requires notice in all classes, and so on, without collapsing
the categories. Nonetheless, the draft transforms the "superiority" requirement of present subdivision (b)(3) into a subdivision (a) prerequisite for any class. The (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) categories become
merely factors to be considered in determining superiority, adding the
"matters pertinent" of present (b)(3) to the list of superiority factors.
In addition to these changes, a number of smaller changes also deserve note.
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B.

The Changes

One item that has drawn strong reaction is the addition of a requirement that a representative party be "willing" to represent the
class. It is widely believed that this requirement will sound the death
knell of defendant classes-except perhaps for the most dangerous
case in which a named defendant is willing to "represent" the class
because its interests diverge from class interests, and may even converge with the plaintiff's interests.
Quite different reactions are provoked by the allied requirement
that the representative member "protect the interests of all persons
while members of the class until relieved by the court from that fiduciary duty." This provision is intended to underscore the fiduciary responsibilities borne by a representative party. It does not, however,
explain in any way the nature or extent of those duties. There is no
indication of any specific change in present practice. Practicing lawyers in particular react to the provision with dismay. They view present understanding of the fiduciary responsibilities of counsel and
representatives as satisfactory, and fear that this opaque invocation
will generate much contention and no improvement.
Subdivision (b)(2) is rewritten to make it clear that it is proper to
certify a defendant class in an action for injunctive or declaratory relief. Apart from the question of whether a willing representative
should be required, this change seems noncontroversiaL
The subdivision (b)(3) requirement that common questions of
fact or law predominate is mollified by making "the extent to which"
common questions predominate one factor in calculating superiority.
This change is one of many that are intended to ease the path toward
certification of issues classes.
Difficulties in management are made relevant to the classes that
were (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes as well as (b)(3) classes, but essentially
are subordinated by requiring comparison to the difficulties that vill
arise from adjudication by other means.
The new opt-out and opt-in provisions are set out in subdivision
(c)(1)(A), perhaps the single most important portion of the revised
Rule. The list of "matters pertinent to this determination" is intended
to discourage opt-out (b)(1) or (b)(2) classes, but not to forbid them.
Opting out of such classes is designed, at least in part, as a means of
revealing the conflicts of interest that may lurk in a class that seems
homogeneous to the court. The illustration in the Committee Note is
an employment-discrimination action in which employees who are
members of the class as defined by the court may prefer to align with
the employer on questions of liability or relief. Provision is made for
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imposing conditions on those who opt out, including a bar against separate actions or denial of nonmutual issue preclusion should the class
win. (The bar against separate actions may need to account for class
judgments that do not bar separate actions by those who remain class
members.) Opt-in classes are proposed as solutions for at least two
sets of problems. Opt-in defendant classes may prove plausible in
some circumstances, greatly reducing the difficulties that now appear
in defendant classes. Opt-in plaintiff classes may be particularly useful as to classes that include many members whose claims would support individual actions, and may help avoid problems beyond the
reach of the Enabling Act. Those who opt into a class, for example,
would surrender any objections to "personal jurisdiction" and could
be forced to acquiesce in a stated choice of law. For all that appears
on the face of the draft, finally, it may be possible to combine all features in a single class: opting out could be prohibited to some claimants and permitted to others, while defining a class that includes
nonmembers only if they choose to opt in. As one possible illustration, the class might be mandatory as to small-stakes claimants, optional as to large-stakes claimants, and defined to exclude those who
already have suits pending unless they choose to opt in.
The new notice provisions are set out in subdivision (c)(2). Notice of class certification is required in all class actions. The court has
discretion in determining "how, and to whom, notice will be given,"
considering, among other factors: the nature of the class, the importance of individual claims, the expense and difficulty of providing individual notice, and the nature and extent of any adverse consequences
from failure to receive actual notice. There has been no adverse reaction to the choice to adopt explicit notice requirements for what now
are (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, nor, perhaps surprisingly, to the softening of individual notice requirements in what now are (b)(3) classes.
Subdivision (c)(4) is the focal point for a phrase that recurs
throughout the draft amendments. A class may be certified as to particular "claims, defenses, or issues." Although subdivision (c)(4) now
provides for issues classes, there is a deliberate attempt to focus attention on, and to encourage, this practice. Once again, mass torts are
not far from view. One potential use of issues classes would be to
resolve common elements of liability, leaving, for separate actions,
resolution of individual elements of liability such as comparative fault
and damages. Adroit definition of the "issue" also might help to reduce choice-of-law problems, particularly with respect to factdominated issues such as general causation.
A new subparagraph (d)(1)(B) expressly recognizes a practice
followed in most courts, permitting decision of motions under Rules
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12 or 56 before the certification determination. This confirmation of
general practice seems unexceptionable.
Subdivision (e) is amended to make it clear that court approval is
required for dismissal of an action in which class allegations are made
whether dismissal is sought before determination of the certification
question or after certification is made. It also provides that a proposal
to dismiss or compromise a certified class action may be referred to a
magistrate judge or "other special master." The role of the special
master is not defined. The Committee Note refers to "investigation"
of the fairness of a proposed dismissal or settlement, to the need to
consider sensitive information, and to the problem that when all parties seek approval of a settlement the court cannot rely on genuinely
adversarial presentation of information that might undercut the proposal. There could be real advantages in independent investigation by
a master, but the more independent and thorough the investigation,
the greater the departure from the ordinary role of court officers.
There may be real advantages as well in confidential submissions to an
officer who will not be called upon to decide the merits if the settlement should fail, but to preserve this advantage the master may need
to report to the judge in terms that do not allow effective evaluation
of the master's own recommendations.
New subdivision (f), finally, authorizes the court of appeals to
permit an appeal from an order granting or denying certification. The
only change is to eliminate the requirement of district court certification that may defeat appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This subdivision rests on two judgments. The first is that interlocutory review of
the certification decision can be very important, to protect against
both the "death-knell" effects of a refusal to certify and the "interrorem" (reverse-death-knell) effects of certification. The second is
that the courts of appeals will exercise sound judgment, granting permission to appeal only in cases in which the certification determination is manifestly important and at least subject to fair debate.
Routine determinations in mature areas of class action practice are
not likely subjects for permission. This provision has drawn strong
support but also, although less often, vigorous disagreement.
C. Some Obvious Questions
The outline of the amendments suggests the most obvious questions: Should the now-accepted (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) distinctions
be collapsed? The direct reason for the collapse is the desire to
change opt-out practice, create an opt-in practice, and improve the
notice provisions. This reason ties to a second reason-the belief that
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unnecessary energy is wasted on disputing the choice of class category
as an indirect means of affecting notice and opt-out decisions. This
second reason may be unimportant; even if there is significant litigation of class-category determinations in areas that have not developed
a routine class practice, direct changes in the opt-out, opt-in practice,
and in notice, should redirect energy toward the intended target.
The risk of collapsing class categories may lie in part in surrender
of the legitimacy lent by the traditions that underlie (b)(1) and the
moral force lent by the contemporary civil rights uses of (b)(2). More
important risks may arise from the prospect that class members might
be allowed to opt out, particularly from (b)(1) classes. Equally important risks may arise from the opportunity to defeat opting out from
(b)(3) classes, particularly as to class members who wish to pursue
individual litigation in hopes of better results. Flexibility and discretion have carried us far in modem procedure, but perhaps these are
situations that call for the rigidity of present rules. Even if more flexibility is appropriate, the Rule should provide as much guidance as
possible for its exercise.
The question of whether class representatives should be willing to
represent the class has focused attention on defendant classes. There
are many reasons why a defendant should be unwilling to assume the
obligations of class representative. As representative, the defendant
has fiduciary obligations to the class. Presumably one duty is to defend vigorously in proportion to the stakes-and the stakes are expanded, perhaps exponentially, by class certification. (Even if the
representative is theoretically subject to joint liability for the plaintiff's entire claim, the very reason for pursuing a defendant class is to
enhance the prospects of actual recovery.) Freedom to settle or even
abandon the defense is sharply curtailed. And if the representative
defendant is allowed to escape the duties of representation by settling
individual liability alone, the burdens of representation may exert a
coercive force to settle on unfair terms. Barring an extraordinary congruence of interest between the representative and all other class
members, the duty of counsel is changed and made more difficult (if
not impossible): fiduciary obligations run to absent class members as
well as to the original client. And any attempt to find means of compensating the representative for these added burdens will remain difficult. Opt-in defendant classes make clear sense; opt-out classes that
involve sophisticated defendants with clear actual notice can make
equal sense; in other settings, these problems seem acute. Addressing
them by adding a "willing" representative requirement may not be as
effective as some alternative.
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It is not clear, moreover, that a willing representative is any more
to be welcomed. Long ago I stumbled across a case that certified a
(b)(2) defendant class in an action to enjoin patent infringement.
Quite apart from individual questions of infringement, different infringers may have very different stakes in the question of validity; the
representative defendant, for example, could enjoy a technology that
yields a scant five percent cost saving with practice of the invention,
while all other class members compete with an older technology that
yields a twenty-five percent cost saving with practice of the invention.
The representative defendant may be made better off by a holding of
validity that binds the industry. The potential conflicts may be much
more subtle than this simple illustration, but equally dangerous.
The willing representative requirement also provokes the question whether defendants should be able to force plaintiff class treatment. The idea may seem far-fetched, but it is not clear whether it
should be hobbled by dropping a willingness requirement into Rule
23(a)(4). The question can easily be turned back to the defendant
class issue, moreover, by the device of a transposed parties action in
which the plaintiff names a defendant class and seeks a declaration of
nonliability. In some settings this device would be ludicrous. Imagine, for example, an action by a government official against a class of
public-benefit recipients for a declaration that a new restrictive regulation is valid.
This illustration suggests that it may be appropriate to think
about defendant class actions in terms that extend beyond the immediate problems of the representative defendant. Concerns about the
willing representative requirement have been expressed by pointing to
situations in which defendant classes seem important. The most common examples include securities-law actions against underwriting
groups and actions against many-membered partnerships. These examples are particularly persuasive because the class members have
formed a real-world entity whose activities give rise to the claim; recognizing the entity for this limited legal purpose, even if for no other
legal purpose, is appropriate. A more exotic example is an action to
resolve the identical rights of hundreds or thousands of owners of
fractional interests in mineral-rights leases. This example seems persuasive because the class members have willingly engaged in a set of
closely related and indistinguishable transactions. Another setting
that has posed difficulties under present Rule 23(b)(2) is an action
against numerous public officials pursuing seemingly identical policies
but so far independent that there is no common superior to name as
defendant. The classic illustration was an action against county sheriffs who, in defiance of local federal decisions and state policy, denied
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contact visits to pretrial detainees. This illustration may seem persuasive because there is a strong suspicion of conscious parallelism, if not
outright conspiracy, and because of the clarity of the violations both in
law and in fact. The question is whether Rule 23 should attempt to
capture these features in a way that clearly distinguishes between the
requirements for certifying plaintiff and defendant classes.
One possibility would be to adapt the permissive joinder requirements of Rule 20, limiting the definition of a defendant class to people
who are related by a common "transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences." Others would be to stiffen the Rule
23(a) requirements of typicality and adequacy of representation, to
require individual notice to all defendant class members, or to expand
the right of individual participation to the limits that would be applied
had all class members been joined as individual defendants. Or the
plaintiff might be required to name several representative defendants,
and to name those who have the most substantial stakes if class members have substantially different levels of interest in the outcome. It
might even prove feasible to require the plaintiff to name all members
of the defendant class that can be identified with reasonable effortincluding preliminary discovery-so that the court can select a group
of representatives and develop a cost-sharing plan.
Perhaps better approaches will come to hand. The important
point is that we cannot blithely rely on the abstract assertion that
there is no difference between precluding a potential right and imposing a liability. We must reflect on the human intuition that there is a
difference, whether expressed as the psychological reality of present
endowments, as the ephemeral character of "individual" rights that
practically can be asserted only on a group basis, or as some more
profound perception.
The almost casual reference to fiduciary responsibility in this
draft of Rule 23 may touch too lightly on the single most troubling set
of class action issues. It is not enough to assert that everyone understands that both representative class members and class counsel have
fiduciary responsibilities to the class. The trick is to elaborate that
principle in ways that respond to the special difficulties of class actions, difficulties that arise whenever there are possible conflicts of
interest between individuals joined as if a homogeneous class in which
anything that advances the interests of one must automatically advance the interests of all others in equal measure. The most familiar
analogy may be to the problems that confront a single lawyer who
represents two plaintiffs, each of whom seeks to win the maximum
possible individual advantage in litigating or settling with a common
defendant. The problems of class representation, however, are far
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more complex. The lawyer with two clients can help each client to
develop and articulate that client's own best understanding of personal needs; each of the two clients at least is in a position to supervise
the lawyer's representation. Counsel for the class seldom is in a position to consult with each class member to determine individual interests and needs, or to measure and reconcile the conflicts among
individual interests and needs. Many class members likely will prove
unable to supervise the class lawyer at all, and reliance on the representative class members provides a pale substitute.
The difficulties presented by the attorney-class client relationship
are exacerbated by the wide diversity of classes. Much current debate
focuses on settlement classes that join mind-boggling numbers of
members whose individual claims would support the costs of individual litigation, but who paradoxically may fall into the group of "futures" claimants who do not yet even know that they may have been
injured. Such settings may present the most troubling opportunities
for truly irreconcilable conflicts, and for conflicts that are not easily
resolved by creating subclasses. Rigorous notice requirements and
clearly explained multiple opportunities to opt out may help. The
same devices may not help in other settings, particularly if the typically small size of individual claims makes opting out the equivalent of
surrendering any individual claim. And quite different problems are
likely to arise if the class action actually goes to trial, although the
relative infrequency of trials provides little foundation for speculating
even about the nature of the problems, much less about the nature of
possible solutions.
Rule 23 is silent on the nature of the fiduciary duties borne by
class representatives and counsel. Addressing these questions through
the Rule promises real advantages. For example, federal courts would
be released from the common reliance on state law to govern issues of
professional responsibility, although as members of state bars lawyers
might face dual regulation. In addition, it may be possible to free
these questions from the constraining impact of association with matters of "ethics"-it is easier to discuss the question whether a lawyer
has conformed to a procedural rule than to frame the debate in terms
of ethical behavior, as discussions of current class settlements demonstrate. Yet it will be extraordinarily difficult to articulate any explicit
provisions. Since outright repeal of Rule 23 does not seem to be an
available option, it seems responsible to make other improvements
even if ignorance forces continued silence. The challenge that may be
made by those who hope for some guidance in the Rule, however, is
daunting and must be addressed even if it is not accepted.
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The encouragement of resort to masters to evaluate proposed settlements raises broader questions about judicial review of class settlements. These questions become all the more important as we enter an
era in which settlement classes are sought out by defendants, eager to
buy global peace by agreement with volunteer representatives of
thousands or tens of thousands of claimants. Extraordinarily complex
arrangements are being made, at the cost of pushing Rule 23 beyond
all of the limits that would have seemed invulnerable until tested by
the force of so many claims. In some of these cases the uncertainties
seem so great that reasoned evaluation of fairness may not be possible
by any means. In others there is a strong attraction to independent
investigation and report, but the means seem elusive. A master,
charged as the court to be impartial but armed as a party to undertake
independent investigation, may be one such means. Developing practice with judgment-enforcement masters in institutional reform litigation may provide some guidance. Another possibility is to appoint an
independent representative for the class, whether or not called a
guardian, charged with reviewing the settlement in ways that duplicate
the responsibilities of class counsel but work free from the fear of selfinterest. Reliance on a master may help solve the problems of judicial
time, but does little to address the questions that arise from blending
advocacy and investigation with the judicial role. Reliance on a class
guardian may confuse the roles of counsel and representative members, and create a framework that conduces to inadequately informed
second-guessing. If the problem is real, the most obvious solutions all
seem weak.
A quite different settlement role involves the familiar use of masters to facilitate settlement. Involvement of a master in the process
that leads to a settlement agreement may not only improve the process but also provide a measure of reassurance that the settlement is
reasonable. Good experience with this practice ensures that it will
continue, even without explicit provision in Rule 23 or any obvious
support in Rule 53. It may be desirable, however, to consider the
question of whether a master who has promoted a settlement should
be responsible for advising the court on the fairness of the settlement.
Despite the great advantages of familiarity, it might be better to rely
on a magistrate judge or a new and independent master if the court,
unwilling to rely entirely on class member objectors, seeks advice
from people who do not have a stake in the settlement.
The provision for invoking the aid of masters or magistrate judges
hints at the more pervasive provisions that might be created to spell
out the process of reviewing and approving class action settlements.
The first questions arise from the common resort to "settlement
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classes," either by an initial certification that makes it clear that the
class may be decertified if settlement is not reached, or by simultaneous presentation of a motion for certification and a motion to approve
a settlement already negotiated. The most fundamental question is
whether the basic criteria for certification should apply differently to
class settlement than to class litigation. It seems difficult to argue that
there should be any significant differences in the prerequisites of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and effective representation. If
superiority becomes an additional prerequisite, however, there may
be more room to argue that there are very substantial differences between the superiority of class settlement and the potential superiority
of class litigation. Application of the other factors that bear on a determination of superiority, moreover, is likely to be quite different
with respect to settlement than with respect to litigation. Not all of
the differences favor settlement; the court's ability to determine the
importance of individual litigation, for example, may be much better
informed by adversary argument than by the cooperative presentation
made when class and adversary join to urge acceptance of a settlement. And at a deeper level, it has been argued that counsel for a
class that has been certified only for purposes of settlement bargains
at a great disadvantage, and perhaps with a conflict of interest. The
defendant's incentive to settle is no longer the prospect of trying this
case on the merits, but instead the hope of avoiding vast numbers of
individual cases. And counsel for the class stands to gain nothing if
settlement fails, a prospect that becomes most unsettling when class
certification is sought simultaneously with a "done deal" with a defendant who might have aborted all negotiations with that counsel.
Many other details could be added to Rule 23 to spell out the
nature of the court's duties in reviewing and approving class settlements. Among them is the question whether class members should be
allowed to opt out of a settlement. By far the cleanest way to draft
such a provision would be to recognize a right to opt out that in form
extends to all class actions; it would be difficult to justify any provision
that allowed the court to distinguish between class members who
might reasonably bring individual actions and those who might not.
An unconditional right to opt out of a settlement might, however, impose unreasonable notice costs. Perhaps this problem can be met by
an indirect qualification of the right, giving the court discretion as to
the means of notice to be employed, anticipating that aggregate methods of notice would be used only when individual claims are small,
and perhaps relying on actual notice to a substantial sampling of class
members on the theory that a significant opt-out rate should prompt
reconsideration of the adequacy of the settlement. If we come to ac-
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cept classes of people who have not yet experienced injury, moreover,
the right to opt out might properly carry forward to the time when
injury occurs and the class member chooses whether to participate in
the class settlement or to pursue an individual remedy.
Other proposals for regulating settlement include various means
of bringing more lawyers into the negotiation on behalf of different
subclasses, bargaining for allocation among differently situated members of a nonhomogeneous "class"; providing some means of representation independent of the lawyers who have been recognized as
class counsel; improving the information made available to objectors,
both by detailed notice to all class members of settlement terms and
by more specific response to objectors, before they are forced to articulate their grounds for objecting; and recognizing the court's power to
modify the terms of settlement so long as the defendant's total obligation is not materially increased.
Discussion of settlement also raises issues of attorney fees. Simultaneous negotiation of class relief and fees creates manifest conflict-of-interest problems. Partial solutions might be found in
requiring that the basis for fee determinations be established before
settlement can be undertaken, or that fee issues be settled only after
approval of settlement on the merits. The obstacles that either approach might create to settlement might be reduced by simply considering the occasion for fee negotiations as part of the process of
approving settlement and any fee award. These and related possibilities deserve to be a major focus of the continuing study.
Many other questions could be put to the details of the draft.
They get caught up, however, in the long list of questions set out next.
These questions are among the number that may fairly be addressed
to present practice. For the most part, they recast as questions a welter of anecdotes told by various class action observers and practitioners to illustrate today's experience and perceived-although often
conflicting-truths. Taken together, they pose the embarrassing question whether we really know enough about Rule 23 to be able to make
sound predictions as to the effect of the current draft or any other.
III
WHAT WE MIGHT WISH To KNow OF CURRENT
EXPERIENCE

When asked for reactions to the current state of Rule 23, one
very thoughtful committee replied that it was difficult to achieve any
consensus wisdom because its members individually had experience
with only a few fields of class litigation. Those with substantial experi-
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ence in securities litigation did not have any working knowledge of
employment-discrimination litigation, and so on. This response is a
useful warning. The Committee must hear from many voices, reflecting the full spectrum of experience, if it is to learn much. It also must
hear voices that speak with as much candor and disinterest as possible.
And, to the extent possible, it must encourage independent investigations of the sort now underway at the Federal Judicial Center. The
following collection illustrates the array of assumptions that should be
questioned.
A.

IndividualActions and Aggregation

What relationships can be identified between aggregation and
numbers of individual actions growing out of the same transactional
setting? Does it often happen that large numbers of individual actions
proceed in the same court, or in different courts, without any attempt
at aggregation? Is it possible to identify elements that encourage or
discourage consolidation, considering such things as relative filing
dates, progress toward disposition, identity of counsel, size of claims,
numbers of claimants, substantive principles, and the like? What elements-the same, or others-influence the means of aggregation? Is
actual consolidation ever pursued across the lines that separate different court systems? Are class actions more likely to be pursued after
some experience with individual adjudication, or does this depend
very much on the substantive area: Are class actions the first resort in
some fields, as may be in some areas of securities law, and the last or
never resort in other fields? How often is class certification denied
because it is not desirable to concentrate litigation in one forum, because of the importance of individual control of individual actions, because of the advanced progress of many individual actions, or because
of a judgment that individual actions-perhaps bolstered by nonmutual preclusion, or tacit acquiescence in bellwether litigation-will
prove more manageable?
A quite different question is how many members of certified
classes would have maintained individual actions absent the class action. A clear answer in general terms would help shape a good general rule; the expectation that clear answers could be given for
individual cases would justify a rule that delegates case-by-case discretion to individual judges. But clear answers are likely to remain elusive, even if shrewd guesses may be possible in some settings. For that
matter, it would be even nicer to know what would have been the
outcomes of individual actions, how frequently conflicting results
would have been reached on the merits, whether results on the merits
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would tend to converge over time, and how to measure the recoveries
both in the aggregate and in individual cases.
B. Routine Class Actions
One common hypothesis is that a substantial portion of all actions filed with class allegations is virtually invisible because the actions are somehow standard or routine. This hypothesis may be
translated into the judgment that Rule 23 is working well in most applications, that we should not be misled as to the need for reform by
the occasional dramatic departures. The hypothesis seems to have at
least two parts. The first part, encountered most often in speculation
about the reasons that may explain the substantial under-reporting of
class action filings recently uncovered by the Federal Judicial Center
study, is that boilerplate class allegations are routinely ignored or dispatched without fuss. The second part, encountered regularly in the
reactions of experienced class action lawyers from various fields, is
that Rule 23 has been beaten into shape by the bench and bar and
presents few grounds for dispute in most cases. Everyone recognizes
the appropriateness of (b)(3) certification in securities-law cases, understands the notice drill, knows how to present and win approval of a
settlement and fee awards, and so on.
It seems likely that indeed many actions play out in one of these
ways. But it would be nice to know, and particularly to know more
about the correlations between easy application of Rule 23 and the
substantive subjects of dispute. It also would be nice to know what
happens in the routine applications: How often is certification
granted? What is the relationship between certification and settlement? How often do certified classes go to trial, and how often do
they win? Is there any way to get behind bare numbers?
Suppose, for instance, it should be found that the same distribution of outcomes occurs in all actions with class allegations as in all
other actions, and that the distribution also is the same for actions in
which certification is granted, denied, or ignored. Could we know
what this really means for common protests that class actions exert a
pressure that subordinates the merits of the action to the need to escape alive? True confidence would require an unattainable measure
of the merits of all the cases compared; is it enough to assume that
class allegations are not added deliberately to bolster weak claims,
and that class action procedure-including the cost of notice in (b)(3)
cases-is sufficiently hospitable to strong claims?
Whatever can be made of these questions, we should be able to
learn more about smaller issues. What is the frequency of (b)(1),
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(b)(2), and (b)(3) classes? The rate of certifications granted, denied,
or ignored? The correlation between substantive area and frequency
of class allegations and certifications? The time consumed by class
actions (and, would that it could be known, the time that would have
been devoted to separate actions)?
C. Race To File
The lore includes tales of "parachutists" who scramble madly to
be the first to file class claims in hopes of assuming a lead role in
management and fees. How often are securities class actions filed immediately upon announcement of a disappointing earnings report, or
single-event tort actions before the ashes have cooled? Is there support for the claim that immediate filing is necessary to preserve evidence, particularly in the tort cases, and are class allegations
important to achieving that result? Is anything lost, apart from seemliness, by filing immediately? For example, are inconvenient forums
chosen; is first-filing negatively correlated with the strength of the
claim or ability of counsel; do overlapping actions cause unnecessary
confusion and clean-up costs? Is there, on the other hand, any reason
to reject a simple rule that there is no presumption that counsel who
files first should be counsel for the class, and that there must be a
competition to select class counsel?
D. Representatives: Who? Whence? Why?
The role of class-member-representative parties is one of the richest sources of anecdotes, and particularly cynical anecdotes. Pending
securities-litigation reform bills implicitly reflect the view that classmember-representatives do not adequately fill the role of client under
present practice. It has become a bromide that the beauty of many
class actions is that the lawyers don't have any clients to get in the
way. These occasionally querulous observations raise many questions.
Perhaps the first question is where do representatives come from.
Do they search out counsel, or are they recruited by counsel? How
are they recruited? What reality, if any, underlies the provision in the
pending securities-litigation reform bills that would prohibit brokers
from accepting remuneration for assisting an attorney in obtaining the
representation of a customer? Are there "professional" representatives who appear repeatedly, at least in particular subject areas? How
often do representatives have more than nominal interests? Is there a
correlation between the stakes of individual representatives and the
form of action-are (b)(1) actions more likely to draw representatives
with substantial stakes than (b)(3) actions? Are representatives in
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(b)(2) actions for injunctions more likely to be as much affected by the
outcome as other class members? And how often are they recruited
by interested organizations because they present particularly attractive illustrations of a group interest or injury? What is the real impact
of the requirement that the representative's claims or defenses be typical of the class? Does it really add weight to the requirements of
common questions and adequate representation? Does it at least provide one illustrative bundle of facts that may facilitate discovery and
trial?
Most directly, what are the working relationships between representative class members and class counsel? Do the representatives
play any role as clients, participating in the decisions that shape the
litigating goals and strategies? How much time, effort, and expense
do representatives actually devote to the litigation? Do courts often
attempt to supervise this dimension of adequate representation after
the adequacy determination, and, if so, how? In place of reviewing
representation directly, do courts attempt to rely on substitutes such
as seeking out additional representatives who are not nominated by
class counsel, forming class-member committees, or even appointing
independent counsel or guardians to represent the class in dealing
with class counsel?
Are there significant efforts to supervise class representation by
evaluating the performance of class counsel directly? What means of
evaluation are chosen, and what steps are taken to reduce the implicit
intrusion on the adversary process?
What do representatives get out of it all, whatever the "all" may
be? Simply the satisfaction of pursuing justice, and doing good for
others when the class claim succeeds? Are they rewarded in some
measure for the time and perhaps risk involved in their roles by recoveries that are more favorable than those won by other class members?
E. Time of Certification
Is there any pattern to the point at which the first certification
decision is made? How often are actions filed simultaneously with
proposed settlements and motions for certification? How often are
preliminary motions on the merits decided before addressing certification? What is the effect of local rules requiring that a motion for certification be made within a stated period, perhaps ninety or one
hundred days? Do they impede settlement efforts, encourage prompt
resolution, or have little effect? How regularly is discovery controlled
and focused on the certification question? Is it more feasible in some
substantive areas than others to separate discovery on the merits from
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certification discovery? How often are class definitions changed after
an initial certification; is an initial denial followed by later certification, or an initial certification by decertification?
F. Certification Disputes
How much time is spent contesting certification? Are there correlations between the subjects of litigation and certification disputes?
Is much effort devoted to contesting the choice among (b)(1), (b)(2),
and (b)(3) classes, and does this correlate to the subject of litigation?
How much thought-expressed or unexpressed-is given to the impact of the class definition on the prospects for settlement?
G. PlaintiffClasses
Do defendants ever seek and win plaintiff class certification over
opposition of plaintiffs? How often do defendants acquiesce in certification of a plaintiff class, apart from settlement classes? How frequently do defendants agree to settlements that include chancy class
certifications that may not deliver the hoped-for preclusion benefits?
H. Defendant Classes
How common are defendant classes? Are there identifiable but
narrow settings in which they are most likely? What happens if a
(b)(3) class is certified-do class members opt out in great numbers?
Have means been found to alleviate the added burdens inflicted on
representative defendants? Are there formal or informal means of
cost sharing? How often are defendants willing to represent a class?
Are unwilling representatives effective? Are willing representatives
to be trusted? How do counsel identify potential conflicts between
obligations to the representative client and obligations to the class,
and how are the conflicts resolved?
I. Issues Classes and Subclasses
How frequently, and in what settings, are issues classes (or subclasses) used? How diligent and sophisticated is the inquiry into possible conflicts of interest within a class whenever relief is (or should
be) more complicated than winning the maximum number of dollars
to be distributed according to the only possible measure of uniformity? Consider a securities-fraud action in which, inevitably, different
class members bought and sold different numbers of shares at different times; a "class" of all may disguise differing interests in proving
the ways and times at which the fraud affected the market. Are such
subtleties routinely ignored? Is it better to ignore such complications,
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because the costs of making distinctions outstrip the benefits? What
of actions that touch deeper social interests, such as surviving school
desegregation cases in which a "class" of all students, or all minority
students, almost inevitably includes people with a wide range of views
about appropriate remedies?
Is there any experience at all to illuminate the post-class experience with issues classes? How often is a class-based resolution of
some issue of liability followed by independent actions in different
courts? How are these actions coordinated with any appeals in the
issues class action? Are any efforts made to ensure that subsequent
proceedings do not effectively thwart the class determination? Do the
results of individually litigating individual issues diverge substantially?
For example, do claimants in some states or regions win systematically
greater or lesser recoveries than those in other states or regions?
More fundamentally, is enough care taken to ensure that issues
certified for class treatment are usefully separate from issues that remain for individual disposition? It is frequently suggested, for example, that issues of fault and general causation are suitable for class
treatment, leaving issues of comparative fault, individual cause, and
proximate cause for case-by-case resolution. But how is fault to be
compared without retrying the issue of fault, and perhaps implicitly
impugning the class finding? And how are individual and proximatecause issues to be resolved without retrying the evidence of general
causation? If the answer is found in brute force, will the results in fact
achieve sufficient uniformity to justify the attempt?
J. Notice
What types of notice, at what cost, are required in (b)(1) and
(b)(2) actions? Is there any reason to believe that notice in (b)(3)
actions is not generally adequate? How much does notice cost, and
does the cost defeat legitimate actions seeking small individual recoveries on behalf of many claimants? Is much effort devoted to litigating notice issues? How often is notice of steps other than certification
provided, at what cost, and with what benefit? Do notices of impending settlement provide sufficient detail to enable intelligent appraisal,
if any class member should wish to undertake or hire it? And, of
course, how many class members even attempt to read the notices?
K

Opt-Outs and Opt-Ins

How frequently do members opt out of (b)(3) classes? Can this
be correlated with specific subject areas, size of typical individual
claims, or something else? Why do members choose to opt out or
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remain in? Does the fear of involvement conduce more toward doing
nothing, or toward getting out? How many opt-outs bring independent actions, and again what correlations might be found? How often
is (b)(2) stretched, or (b)(1) distorted, to defeat opt-out opportunities? Is there any significant converse practice, such as defining subclasses in (b)(1) or (b)(2) actions, that effectively permits opting out?
Is it common to structure settlements that allow the defendant to opt
out of the settlement after finding out how many plaintiff class members opt out?
Are devices employed to create what essentially are opt-in
classes, by such means as defining the class to include only those members who file claims?
L. Individual Member Participation
How frequently do nonrepresentative class members seek to participate before the settlement stage? What resistance do they meet
from designated representatives, class counsel, and the party opposing
the class? How much communication is there between class counsel
and nonrepresentative members? If nonrepresentative members attempt to seek out class counsel, how are they received? How often do
nonmembers challenge settlements; seek to appeal judgments; intervene for any purpose? Is there any working concept of the right in a
(b)(3) class action to enter an appearance through counsel that distinguishes it from intervention? Is there experience with this concept
that might demonstrate whether it should apply to all forms of class
actions?
M. Settlement
Many of the questions have been touched above. Does certification coerce settlement of frivolous or near-frivolous claims? What
means have been used to support effective judicial supervision when
all parties submit information in support of settlement? And if certification is first sought at the settlement stage, is the attempt to ensure
compliance with notice and certification requirements more effective
than the attempt to evaluate the merits of the settlement? How frequently do nonrepresentative class members appear to contest settlement, and with what effect? Are significant problems of conflicting
interests within the class papered over? Do settlements often include
provisions that are, by some reasonable measure, disproportionately
favorable to class representatives?
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N. Trial
How often are certified class actions actually tried on the merits?
With what results? Is there a correlation with subject matter and class
type? Are trials more common in (b)(2) actions that pursue still developing legal theories, and less common in (b)(3) actions with large
sums at stake?
0. Small Claims Classes
How frequently do certified (b)(3) classes result in relatively trivial relief for individual class members, measured by mean, median, or
mode recoveries? Is it possible to guess at the social enforcement
value of a significant total parcelled out in many small shares? Are
there meaningful parallel questions for other class types, such as trivial injunctive relief in a (b)(2) action, perhaps coupled with significant
fees? How often do courts experiment still with substitute modes of
recovery, such as distribution to charitable institutions?
P. Fee-Recovery Ratios
Another cynical belief is that many class actions serve only to
confer benefits on class counsel. Token class benefits are accompanied by handsome fee awards. It would be interesting to know the
pattern of relationships between fee awards and total class recovery
across a wide spectrum of cases. The Federal Judicial Center study of
a very small number of cases from a sample chosen for other purposes
suggested that class benefits regularly exceed fees, and that fees are a
larger percentage of class recovery in cases that yield small total recoveries. If this pattern is generally true, it provides substantial reassurance. Additional reassurance would be supplied if there are
enough cases tried on the merits to support meaningful comparison of
the fee awards and ratios with settled cases.
A more elusive concern lies beyond the simple ratios. A high
ratio of fees to recovery may reflect high-quality work done to support
weak but deserving claims. It also may reflect the coercive benefits of
pursuing undeserving claims, or the betrayal of strong class claims by
bargain settlements. This concern may prove almost impossible to
test.
If there is any experience to measure, it also would be useful to
learn the means by which courts have attempted to regulate fees beyond use of a "lodestar" approach. How often is special importance
attached to the actual benefits won for the class? Is there any significant attempt, by auction or otherwise, to stimulate competing offers of
representation?
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Is there any way to get at such intriguing information as a comparison between the economic gains from representing classes as compared to the economic gains from opposing classes? And is there
anything to be learned from such information if it can be found: If,
for example, it were concluded that class counsel average a higher return per hour of apparently equal effort, would that tell us more than
an equal or lower average rate of return?
Q. Overlapping Classes
How often are overlapping class actions brought in different
courts? What means are found to arrange a coherent resolution that
avoids parallel proceedings? Are the problems more severe if one or
more overlapping actions are filed in state courts? One description
has painted a startling picture of competing class actions, in which the
proposed settlement in an opt-out class is met by formation of a rival
class with promises of better results. Does this really happen? If it
does, what are the results for class members? What about more imaginative possibilities, such as formation of a rival class and delegation
to the class representatives of the power to opt out of the initial class
on behalf of all members of the new class?
R Counterclaimsand Discovery
There does not seem to be much concern with the prospect of
counterclaims and discovery involving nonrepresentative class members. Is there regular acceptance that these devices are not worthwhile? That they are employed, but only in special settingsindividual discovery of individual liability or damages issues? For example, is it disciplined, and does it occur only when it becomes immediately relevant? Are there unknown problems that should be
addressed?
S. Res Judicata
Peace is the tradeoff for a class judgment, win or lose. The theory
is reasonably clear. But reported cases do not give much sense of actual impact. To the extent that class actions involve claims that would
not support individual litigation in any event, there is little reason for
concern. But it would be useful to know how often class judgments
deter individual actions that otherwise would have been brought; how
often individual actions are attempted but fail on preclusion grounds;
and how often individual actions overcome preclusion defenses because of direct limits on preclusion, inadequate representation, inadequate notice, or other grounds.
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CONCLUSION

Several purposes are served by posing a daunting list of questions
that are difficult or impossible to answer. The one that may be most
important is to demonstrate a central challenge of the rulemaking process. Courts have cases and must decide them. Procedure must be
adapted as well as can be to changing circumstances and needs. If all
procedural reform were held hostage to the slow progress of information that meets the rigorous standards of good social science, there
would be precious little reform. Nowhere is this prospect more evident than with class actions. What is needed is wise judgment regarding the balance between the enthusiasm arising from perceived needs
for change on the one hand and, on the other, the caution engendered
by perceived ignorance, as well as the recognition that more confident
judgment is needed to justify more dramatic departures from practices
proved by at least some experience. When rigorous evidence is lacking, judgment is properly informed by a consensus of anecdotes, encouraging as much anecdotal input, drawing from as much shared
experience, as can be. At the same time, judgment is restrained by
recognition of the inadequacies of present knowledge and the fallibilities of prediction.
Individual judgments will differ on the results of the last leap into
the unknown with Rule 23. The career of the 1966 amendments surely
teaches a humbling lesson on the fallibility of foresight, however good
the unforeseen consequences may be. Perhaps we know enough to
justify modest changes in Rule 23. Possibly we should have the courage to experiment with more drastic changes. If no changes are made,
we never will know their fate. If changes are made, it will be years
before we even think we know. The greatest cause for concern in the
midst of all this is that there seems to be little collective sense of any
need for significant change, apart from the area of mass torts. There is
a real sense that we need to find better means of addressing mass
torts, but almost no sense yet as to the blend of substantive and procedural means that will prove better. Rule 23 is only one alternative,
and the foundation that might securely anchor a new structure still
needs to be sunk.
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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE*
Rule 23. Class Actions (February 1995 Draft)
(a) Prerequisites te a C!Gis Acti.o'n. One or more members
of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all ly if-with respect to the claims, defenses, or issues certified for class action treatment(1) the lass-is members are so numerous that joinder of
all membes-is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of lame or fact legal or factual
questions are common to the class,
(3) the claimg or defenses of the representative parties'
positions typify those are typcal of the chaim_ ordf
of
the class, and
(4) the representative parties and their attorneys are
willing and able to wil fairly and adequately protect the interests of all persons while members of the class until relieved by the court from that fiduciary duty; and
(5) a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
(b) When Whether a Class Action Ma;it.a.nabl Is Superior.
An .tinmay b.M . n n .A.s .tion if the pre- guisitcs
of subU,io;,n (a) are satisfied, and in addiition The matters pertinent in deciding under (a)(5) whether a class action is superior to
other available methods include:
(1) the extent to which the PreSeGUte n A separate actions by or against individual members of the c!ass weuld
create a rkk of might result in
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with-rthat
spect to
W ind"d memberS 4 the Glass 'ih
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications ,ith.
r-pet to indi dUa mCM-beh of the cAts: ,hg
.ch;woi
d that, as a practical matter
be dispesitiPre of the intgrestr, of the ethcr mwnbcra not
pagties to the adjudkicas nor substantially m irr
• New Matter is underlined; matter to be omitted is lined through.
53
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impede, would dispose of the nonparty members' interests or reduce their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the, class has =td o.r. ref, ed-to
act on grounds gener-ally appeliable to the classthere
making appropriate fina injunect, e relief the extent to which
the relief may take the form of an injunction or GOfe~pGfling-declaratory relief ,ith respect to judgment respecting the
class as a whole; 49
(3) the court fids that the extent to which common
questions of law or fact common to the members-o-a
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a cass action is.p...A
to other-available methods for the fa4r and efficient adjudication oftho
controversy. ThIe matters pertineRt to the findif"gs inelude1
(A-4) the class members' interests
das,-in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions;
(5) the extent and nature of any related litigation Gencern.-,g Me controAersy already oon
d-begun by or
against members of the class;
(G_) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the- Aai-is in the particular forum; and
()7) the likely difficulties likely to be encountedcd-in
the management of managing a class action which will be
eliminated or significantly reduced if the controversy is adjudicated by other available means.
(c) Determinations by Order Whether Class Action to Be
Maintained Certified; Notice and Membership in Class; Judgment; Actias. Conduaclted Parially as Glass, Acions Multiple
Classes and Subclasses.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of
.A
,action3
brought as a c.lag a.-tion persons sue or are sued as
representatives of a class, the court hagl-must determine by
order whether and with respect to what claims, defenses, or
issues it is to be so mainta"ined the action should be certified
as a class action.
(A) An order certifying a class action must describe the class and determine whether, when, how, and
under what conditions putative members may elect to
be excluded from, or included in, the class. The matters
pertinent to this determination will ordinarily include:
(i) the nature of the controversy and the relief
sought;
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(ii) the extent and nature of the members' injuries or liability;
(iii) potential conflicts of interest among
members;
(iv) the interest of the party opposing the class
in securing a final and consistent resolution of the
matters in controversy; and
(v) the inefficiency or impracticality of separate actions to resolve the controversy.
When appropriate, a putative member's election to be excluded may be conditioned upon a prohibition against its
maintaining a separate action on some or all of the matters in
controversy in the class action or a prohibition against its relying in a separate action upon any judgment rendered or
factual finding in favor of the class, and a putative member's
election to be included in a class may be conditioned upon its
bearing a fair share of litigation expenses incurred by the
representative parties.
(B) An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before
in the merts final judgment.
(2) I- any
-eass When ordering that an action be maintiad-certified as a class action under s"b"ivisi;"
- this
rule, the court shall--must direct that appropriate notice be
given to the members of the class under subdivision
(d)(1)(C). The notice must concisely and clearly describe the
nature of the action; the claims, defenses, or issues with respect to which the class has been certified; the persons who
are members of the class; any conditions affecting exclusion
from or inclusion in the class; and the potential consequences
of class membership. In determining how, and to whom, notice will be given, the court may consider the matters listed in
(b) and (c)(1)(A), the expense and difficulties of providing
actual notice to all class members, and the nature and extent
of any adverse consequences that class members may suffer
from a failure to receive actual notice. the best neoticg-pacti
cable under the airrcumntances, incluIng- idiul notice t
A-l members ..
he ca;n be identified through rcasonableffor.
The notice shall ade Pah m iembere
that ( th r U l
exclude themmerfo the clasr if the member so requ-csmt
by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whetherf'.oabe
not, wil incAude :ll-;]I
r who do gaot rcquest exclusion
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and (G) any member ,o-

es -notrequest exclusion may,
through counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action certified-naintaned as a
class action under
..
,subdi;ision
(b)(1) or (b ( ".hether.o
not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those
w:hom the court finds to be members of the clas. The judg

the mem r-de sires, enter an appear n

ment in An .. tion m..nta;ined

,aclass
n

in under rudi'

sion (b)(9 , whether or not favorable to the class, shl
inalude and-must specify or describe those to whem the no
tire provided im subdivision (G)(2) was directed and-whe
have not requested exclu ion, and whom the court
#imds..who
are to-b-a-members of the class or have elected to be excluded on conditions affecting any separate actions.
(4) When appropriate-(A, an action may be brought or
maktahimedcertified as a class action with respect to particular claims, defenses, or issues-"P-(B4_by or against multiple
classes or subclasses. Subclasses need not separately satisfy
the requirements of subdivision (a)(1). a class may be di
vided into sabclasseE n-d each subclass-treated as a cma sand
the provisions of this nie shall then be construed and ap(d) Orders in Conduct of Class Actions.
f) In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies,
the court may make appropriate orders that:
(lIA) deteragang determine the course of proceedings or prsibig -prescribe measures to prevent undue
repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument;
(B) decide a motion under Rule 12 or 56 before the
certification determination if the court concludes that

the decision will promote the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy and will not cause undue delay;
(2C) requiring, for the pro-tection of the me.mbr
of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the, actio-, that require notice be given in su . manner -a&4ho
Geuan may directto some or all of the class members or
putative members of.
(i) any step in the action, including certification, modification, or decertification of a class, or
refusal to certify a class o-e-a;
(ii) the proposed extent of the judgmenty; or of
(iii) the members' opportunity oftmnonbors to
signify whether they consider the representation
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fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
(3D) impsin"g-impose conditions on the representative parties, class members, or on intervenors;
(4E) rquit -require that the pleadings be
amended to eliminate thre m allegations as-to about
representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly, or
(5DF dealing with similar procedural matters.
(2) he-orders An order under Rule 23(d)(1) may be
combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered
or amended as may be desrable from time to timc.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. An Gdas-action in which persons sue or are sued as representatives of a class must shal-not,
before the court's ruling under subdivision (c)(1), be dismissed,
be amended to delete the request for certification as a class action, or be compromised without th&-approval of the court,-ad
11shall b gvn
m
nontice of the proposed dismissal ormprc"drt
=u #e d.c s.An
;l members of the c!a;s in such ma-mer
action certified as a class action must not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court, and notice of a proposed
voluntary dismissal or compromise must be given to some or all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs. A proposal to dismiss or compromise an action certified as a class action may be referred to a magistrate judge or other special master
under Rule 53 without regard to the provisions of Rule 53(b).
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may permit an appeal from
an order granting or denying a request for class action certification under this rule upon application to it within ten days after
entry of the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so
orders.
COMMITIEE NOTE
PURPOSE OF REVISION.

As initially adopted, Rule 23 defined

class actions as "true," "hybrid," or "spurious" according to the abstract nature of the rights involved. The 1966 revision created a new
tripartite classification in subdivision (b), and then established different provisions relating to notice and exclusionary rights based on that
classification. For (b)(3) class actions, the rule mandated "individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort" and a right by class members to "opt-out" of the class. For
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(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, however, the rule did not by its terms
mandate any notice to class members, and was generally viewed as not
permitting any exclusion of class members. This structure has frequently resulted in time-consuming procedural battles either because
the operative facts did not fit neatly into any one of the three categories, or because more than one category could apply and the selection
of the proper classification would have a major impact on whether and
how the case should proceed as a class action.
In the revision, the separate provisions of former subdivisions
(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) are combined and treated as pertinent factors in deciding "whether a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy,"
which is added to subdivision (a) as a prerequisite for any class action.
The issue of superiority of class action resolution is made a critical
question, without regard to whether, under the former language, the
case would have been viewed as being brought under (b)(1), (b)(2), or
(b)(3). Use of a unitary standard, once the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, is the approach taken by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and adopted in several
states.
Questions regarding notice and exclusionary rights remain important in class actions-and, indeed, may be critical to due process.
Under the revision, however, these questions are ones that should be
addressed on their own merits, given the needs and circumstances of
the case and without being tied artificially to the particular classification of the class action.
The revision emphasizes the need for the court, parties, and counsel to focus on the particular claims, defenses, or issues that are appropriate for adjudication in a class action. Too often, classes have been
certified without recognition that separate controversies may exist between plaintiff class members and a defendant which should not be
barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion. Also, the placement in
subdivision (c)(4) of the provision permitting class actions for particular issues has tended to obscure the potential benefit of resolving certain claims and defenses on a class basis while leaving other
controversies for resolution in separate actions.
As revised, the rule will afford some greater opportunity for use
of class actions in appropriate cases notwithstanding the existence of
claims for individual damages and injuries-at least for some issues, if
not for the resolution of the individual damage claims themselves.
The revision is not however an unqualified license for certification of
a class whenever there are numerous injuries arising from a common
or similar nucleus of facts. The rule does not attempt to authorize or
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establish a system for "fluid recovery" or "class recovery" of damages,
nor does it attempt to expand or limit the claims that are subject to
federal jurisdiction by or against class members.
The major impact of this revision will be on cases at the margin:
most cases that previously were certified as class actions will be certified under this rule, and most that were not certified will not be certified under the rule. There will be a limited number of cases, however,
where the certification decision may differ from that under the prior
rule, either because of the use of a unitary standard or the greater
flexibility respecting notice and membership in the class.
Various non-substantive stylistic changes are made to conform to
style conventions adopted by the Committee to simplify the present
rules.
SUBDIVISION (A). Subdivision (a)(4) is revised to explicitly require that the proposed class representatives and their attorneys be
both willing and able to undertake the fiduciary responsibilities inherent in representation of a class. The willingness to accept such responsibilities is a particular concern when the request for class treatment is
not made by those who seek to be class representatives, as when a
plaintiff requests certification of a defendant class. Once a class is certified, the class representatives and their attorneys will, until the class
is decertified or they are otherwise relieved by the court, have an obligation to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, taking no action for their own benefit that would be inconsistent with the
fiduciary responsibilities owed to the class.
Paragraph (5)-the superiority requirement-is taken from subdivision (b)(3) and becomes a critical element for all class actions.
The introductory language in subdivision (a) stresses that, in ascertaining whether the five prerequisites are met, the court and litigants should focus on the matters that are being considered for class
action certification. The words "claims, defenses, or issues" are used
in a broad and non-legalistic sense. While there might be some cases
in which a class action would be authorized respecting a specifically
defined cause of action, more frequently the court would set forth a
generalized statement of the matters for class action treatment, such
as all claims by class members against the defendant arising from the
sale of specified securities during a particular period of time.
SU3DIVISION (B). As noted, subdivision (b) has been substantially reorganized. One element, drawn from former subdivision
(b)(3), is made a controlling issue for all class actions and moved to
subdivision (a)(5); namely, whether a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The other provisions of former subdivision (b) then become
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factors to be considered in making this determination. Of course,
there is no requirement that all of these factors be present before a
class action may be ordered, nor is this list intended to exclude other
factors that in a particular case may bear on the superiority of a class
action when compared to other available methods for resolving the
controversy.
SUBDIVISION (c). Former paragraph (2) of this subdivision contained the provisions for notice and exclusion in (b)(3) class actions.
Under the revision, the provisions relating to exclusion are made
applicable to all class actions, but with flexibility for the court to determine whether, when, and how putative class members should be
allowed to exclude themselves from the class. The court may also impose appropriate conditions on such "opt-outs"-or, in some cases,
even require that a putative member "opt-in" in order to be treated as
a member of the class.
The potential for class members to exclude themselves from
many class actions remains a primary consideration for the court in
determining whether to allow a case to proceed as a class action, both
to assure due process and in recognition of individual preferences.
Even in the most compelling situation for not allowing exclusion-the
fact pattern described in subdivision (b)(1)(A)-a person might nevertheless be allowed to be excluded from the class upon the condition
that the person will not maintain any separate action and hence, as a
practical matter, be bound by the outcome of the class action. The
opportunity to elect exclusion from a class may also be useful, for example, in some employment discrimination action in which certain
employees otherwise part of the class may, because of their own positions, wish to align themselves with the employer's side of the litigation either to assist in the defense of the case or to oppose the relief
sought for the class.
Ordinarily, putative class members electing to be excluded from a
plaintiff class will be free to bring their own individual actions, unhampered by factual findings adverse to the class, while potentially
able, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, to benefit from factual
findings favorable to the class. The revised rule permits the court, as a
means to avoid this inequity, to impose a condition on "opting out"
that will preclude an excluded member from relying in a separate action upon findings favorable to the class.
Rarely should a court impose an "opt-in" requirement for membership in a class. There are, however, situations in which such a requirement may be desirable to avoid potential due process problems,
such as with some defendant classes or in cases where an opt-out right
would be appropriate but it is impossible or impractical to give mean-
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ingful notice of the class action to all putative members of the class.
With defendant classes it may be appropriate to impose a condition
that requires the "opting-in" defendant class members to share in the
litigation expenses of the representative party. Such a condition
would be rarely needed with plaintiff classes since typically the claims
on behalf of the class, if successful, would result in a common fund or
benefit from which litigation expenses of the representative can be
charged.
Under the revision, some notice of class certification is required
for all types of class actions, but flexibility is provided respecting the
type and extent of notice to be given to the class, consistent with constitutional requirements for due process. Actual notice to all putative
class members should not, for example, be needed when the conditions of subdivision (b)(1) are met or when, under subdivision
(c)(1)(A), membership in the class is limited to those who file an election to be members of the class. Problems have sometimes been encountered when the class members' individual interests, though
meriting protection, were quite small when compared with the cost of
providing notice to each member; the revision authorizes such factors
to be taken into account by the court in determining, subject to due
process requirements, what notice should be directed.
The revision to subdivision (c)(4) is intended to eliminate the
problem when a class action with several subclasses should be certified, but one or more of the subclasses may not independently satisfy
the "numerosity" requirement.
Under former paragraph (4), some issues could be certified for
resolution as a class action, while other matters were not so certified.
By adding similar language to other portions of the rule, the Committee intends to emphasize the potential utility of this procedure. For
example, in some mass tort situations, it might be appropriate to certify some issues relating to the defendants' culpability and-if the relevant scientific knowledge is sufficiently well developed-general
causation for class action treatment, while leaving issues relating to
specific causation, damages, and contributory negligence for potential
resolution through individual lawsuits brought by members of the
class.
SUBDIVISION (D). The former rule generated uncertainty concerning the appropriate order of proceeding when a motion addressed
to the merits of claims or defenses is submitted prior to a decision on
whether a class should be certified. The revision provides the court
with discretion to address a Rule 12 or Rule 56 motion in advance of a
certification decision if this will promote the fair and efficient adjudi-
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cation of the controversy. See Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, § 30.11.
Inclusion in the former subdivision (c)(2) of detailed requirements for notice in (b)(3) actions sometimes placed unnecessary barriers to formation of a class, as well as masked the desirability, if not
need, for notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. Even if not required for
due process, some form of notice to class members should be regarded
as desirable in virtually all class actions. Subdivision (c)(2) requires
that notice be given if a class is certified, though under subdivision
(d)(1)(C) the particular form of notice is committed to the sound discretion of the court, keeping in mind the requirements of due process.
Subdivision (d)(1)(C) contemplates that some form of notice may be
desirable with respect to many other important rulings; subdivision
(d)(1)(C)(i), for example, calls the attention of the court and litigants
to the possible need for some notice if the court declines to certify a
class in an action filed as a class action or reduces the scope of a previously certified class. In such circumstances, particularly if putative
class members have become aware of the case, some notice may be
needed informing the class members that they can no longer rely on
the action as a means for pursuing their rights.
SUBDIVISION (E). There are sound reasons for requiring judicial
approval of proposals to voluntarily dismiss, eliminate class allegations, or compromise an action filed or ordered maintained as a class
action. The reasons for requiring notice of such a proposal to members of a putative class are significantly less compelling. Despite the
language of the former rule, courts have recognized the propriety of a
judicially-supervised precertification dismissal or compromise without
requiring notice to putative class members. E.g., Shelton v. Pargo,582
F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978). The revision adopts that approach. If circumstances warrant, the court has ample authority to direct notice to
some or all putative class members pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (d). While the provisions of subdivision (e) do not apply if
the court denies the request for class certification, there may be cases
in which the court will direct under subdivision (d) that notice of the
denial of class certification be given to those who were aware of the
case.
Evaluations of proposals to dismiss or settle a class action sometimes involve highly sensitive issues, particularly should the proposal
be ultimately disapproved. For example, the parties may be required
to disclose weaknesses in their own positions, or to provide information needed to assure that the proposal does not directly or indirectly
confer benefits upon class representatives or their counsel inconsistent
with the fiduciary obligations owed to members of the class or other-
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wise involve conflicts of interest. Accordingly, in some circumstances,
investigation of the fairness of these proposals conducted by an
independent master can be of great benefit to the court, particularly
since the named parties and their counsel have ceased to be adversaries with respect to the proposed dismissal or settlement. The revision
clarifies that the strictures of Rule 53(b) do not preclude the court
from appointing under that Rule a special master to assist the court in
evaluating a proposed dismissal or settlement. The master, if not a
Magistrate Judge, would be compensated as provided in Rule 53(a).
SUBDIVISIoN (F). The certification ruling is often the crucial ruling in a case filed as a class action. The plaintiff, in order to obtain
appellate review of a ruling denying certification, will have to proceed
with the case to final judgment and may have to incur litigation expenses wholly disproportionate to any individual recovery; and, if the
plaintiff ultimately prevails on an appeal of the certification decision,
postponement of the appellate decision raises the specter of "one way
intervention." Conversely, if class certification is erroneously granted,
a defendant may be forced to settle rather than run the risk of potentially ruinous liability of a class-wide judgment in order to secure review of the certification decision. These consequences, as well as the
unique public interest in properly certified class actions, justify a special procedure allowing early review of this critical ruling.
Recognizing the disruption that can be caused by piecemeal reviews, the revision contains provisions to minimize the risk of delay
and abuse. Review will be available only by leave of the court of appeals promptly sought, and proceedings in the district court with respect to other aspects of the case are not stayed by the prosecution of
such an appeal unless the district court or court of appeals so orders.
The appellate procedure would be the same as for appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(c). The statutory authority for using the rule-making
process to permit an appeal of interlocutory orders is contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1292(e), as amended in 1992.
It is anticipated that orders permitting immediate appellate review will be rare. Nevertheless, the potential for this review should
encourage compliance with the certification procedures and afford an
opportunity for prompt correction or error.
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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 23. Class Actions (February 1995 Draft)
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all if-with respect to the
claims, defenses, or issues certified for class action treatment(1) the members are so numerous that joinder of all is
impracticable,
(2) legal or factual questions are common to the class,
(3) the representative parties' positions typify those of the
class,
(4) the representative parties and their attorneys are willing
and able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of all persons while members of the class until relieved by the court from
that fiduciary duty; and
(5) a class action is superior to other available methods for
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
(b) Whether a Class Action is Superior. The matters pertinent in
deciding under (a)(5) whether a class action is superior to other available methods include:
(1) the extent to which separate actions by or against individual members might result in
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications that, as a practical matter, would dispose of the nonparty members' interests or reduce their ability to protect their interests;
(2) the extent to which the relief may take the form of an
injunction or declaratory judgment respecting the class as a
whole;
(3) the extent to which common questions of law or fact
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members;
(4) the class members' interests in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(5) the extent and nature of any related litigation already begun by or against members of the class;
(6) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum; and
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(7) the likely difficulties in managing a class action which will
be eliminated or significantly reduced if the controversy is adjudicated by other available means.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be Certified; Notice and Membership in Class; Judgment; Multiple Classes
and Subclasses.
(1) As soon as practicable after persons sue or are sued as
representatives of a class, the court must determine by order
whether and with respect to what claims, defenses, or issues the
action should be certified as a class action.
(A) An order certifying a class action must describe the
class and determine whether, when, how, and under what
conditions putative members may elect to be excluded from,
or included in, the class. The matters pertinent to this determination will ordinarily include:
(i) the nature of the controversy and the relief
sought;
(ii) the extent and nature of the members' injuries
or liability;
(iii) potential conflicts of interest among members;
(iv) the interest of the party opposing the class in
securing a final and consistent resolution of the matters
in controversy; and
(v) the inefficiency or impracticality of separate actions to resolve the controversy.
When appropriate, a putative member's election to be excluded
may be conditioned upon a prohibition against its maintaining a separate action on some or all of the matters in controversy in the class
action or a prohibition against its relying in a separate action upon any
judgment rendered or factual finding in favor of the class, and a putative member's election to be included in a class may be conditioned
upon its bearing a fair share of litigation expenses incurred by the
representative parties.
(B) An order under this subdivision may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before final judgment.
(2) When ordering that an action be certified as a class action
under this rule, the court must direct that appropriate notice be
given to the class under subdivision (d)(1)(C). The notice must
concisely and clearly describe the nature of the action; the claims,
defenses, or issues with respect to which the class has been certified; the persons who are members of the class; any conditions
affecting exclusion from or inclusion in the class; and the potential consequences of class membership. In determining how, and
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to whom, notice will be given, the court may consider the matters
listed in (b) and (c)(1)(A), the expense and difficulties of providing actual notice to all class members, and the nature and extent
of any adverse consequences that class members may suffer from
a failure to receive actual notice.
(3) The judgment in an action certified as a class action,
whether or not favorable to the class, must specify or describe
those who are members of the class or have elected to be excluded on conditions affecting any separate actions.
(4) When appropriate, an action may be certified as a class
action with respect to particular claims, defenses, or issues by or
against multiple classes or subclasses. Subclasses need not separately satisfy the requirements of subdivision (a)(1).
(d) Orders in Conduct of Class Actions.
(1) In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the
court may make appropriate orders that:
(A) determine the course of proceedings or prescribe
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the
presentation of evidence or argument;
(B) decide a motion under Rule 12 or 56 before the certification determination if the court concludes that the decision will promote the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy and will not cause undue delay;
(C) require notice to some or all of the class members
or putative members of:
(i) any step in the action, including certification,
modification, or decentrification of a class, or refusal to
certify a class;
(ii) the proposed extent of the judgment; or
(iii) the members' opportunity to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to
intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise
to come into the action;
(D) impose conditions on the representative parties,
class members, or intervenors;
(E) require the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representations of absent persons, and that the
action proceed accordingly, or
(F) deal with similar procedural matters.
(2) An order under Rule 23(d)(1) may be combined with an
order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. An action in which persons sue or
are sued as representatives of a class must not, before the court's rul-
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ing under subdivision (c)(1), be dismissed, be amended to delete the
request for certification as a class action, or be compromised without
approval of the court. An action certified as a class action must not be
dismissed or compromised without approval of the court, and notice
of a proposed voluntary dismissal or compromise must be given to
some or all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
A proposal to dismiss or compromise an action certified as a class
action may be referred to a magistrate judge or other special master
under Rule 53 without regard to the provisions of Rule 53(b).
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an
order granting or denying a request for class action certification under
this rule upon application to it within ten days after entry of the order.
An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the court of appeals so orders.
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APPENDIX B
November 1995 Draft Rule 23
The following draft Rule 23 was prepared by the Reporter following the November meeting of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.
This draft has not been considered by the Advisory Committee. It
was submitted at the January 1996 meeting of the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure as an informational item, illustrating
a midstream point in the progress of the Advisory Committee as it
considers whether Rule 23 sh6uld be amended. This draft departs
from the earlier draft in several ways. The categorical distinctions between (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) classes are restored. Several changes
are made in the provisions of (b)(3). Many of the decisions reached
by the Advisory Committee in November remain tentative. As one
illustration, no firm decision has been made whether to adopt either
of the alternative versions of item (ii) in the first paragraph of subdivision (b)(3). And many of the provisions carried over from the earlier
draft have not yet been considered by the Committee. If the Committee should decide to go forward with recommendations to amend
Rule 23, it is likely that the actual recommendations will depart substantially from this draft.
Rule 23. Class Actions (November 1995 Draft)
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if - with respect to the claims, defenses, or issues certified for class action
treatment -

(1) the dass-is members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class-I
(3) the- aims r defenses of the repr,,,at..e p..t are typical
of the claims or defenses the representative parties' positions
typify those of the class-; and
(4) the representative parties and their attorneys will fairly and
adequately discharge the fiduciary duty to protect the interests of 4w. all persons while members of the class until relieved by the court from that fiduciary duty.
(b) Class A tions Maintainable When Class Actions May be Certified. An action may be maintained certified as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
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(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class whkh that would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class whkh that would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
.... acte o4r Fresd to at on
(2) t4e p,.", pposing the c,,s. hs
grounds generaly applicable to- the class, thereby making apSPOdpep iate final injunctive or declaratory relief O
ing de.larat.ry rlie may be appropriate with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds (i) that the questions of law or fact common to
the certified class membn= ef the 1as predominate over any
individual questions ffecting only indiv-dua m-.mbe included in the class action, (ii) that [the class claims, issues, or
defenses are not insubstantial on the merits, falternative:1
[the prospect of success on the merits of the class claims, issues, or defenses is sufficient to justify the costs and burdens
imposed by certification], and ( that a class action is superior to other available methods and necessary for the fair and
efficient adjudiGatie. disposition of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to t4 these findings include:
(A) the interest of memberof the cla rsin indi'"du l c..
t.Rollg the Pr. cut.in..
; dfenso eof practical ability of
individual class members to pursue their claims without
class certification and their interests in maintaining or
defending separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any related litigation eencg
theg--a-c~onvy aleady coMmenced by or agais involving class members of the ~a1s;
(C) the desirability er ,ndeskabiEty of concentrating the litigation of +-e e!'imm in the particular forum;
(D) the likely difficulties likey to be ncountered- i th ...
ageGm - A in managing a class action that will be
avoided or significantly reduced if the controversy is adjudicated by other available means;
(E) the probable success on the merits of the class claims, issues, or defenses;
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(F) whether the public interest in - and the private benefits
of - the probable relief to individual class members justify the burdens of the litigation; and
(G) the opportunity to settle on a class basis claims that
could not be litigated on a class basis or could not be
litigated by [or against?l a class as comprehensive as the
settlement class; or
(4) the court finds that permissive joinder should be accomplished by allowing putative members to elect to be included
in a class. The matters pertinent to this finding will ordinarily
include:
(A) the nature of the controversy and the relief sought;
(B) the extent and nature of the members' injuries or
liability;
(C) potential conflicts of interest among members;
(D) the interest of the party opposing the class in securing a
final and consistent resolution of the matters in controversy; and
(E) the inefficiency or impracticality of separate actions to
resolve the controversy; or
(5) the court finds that a class certified under subdivision (b)(2)
should be joined with claims for individual damages that are
certified as a class action under subdivision (b)(3) or (b)(4).
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be Maintained
Certified; Notice and Membership in Class; Judgment; Actions
Conducted Partially as Glass Acn, Multiple Classes and
Subclasses.

(1) As seen as practicable "aftertthe comnMencement of n actIoi
brought a..
..a as action, the court shall determine by order
4A:

I4-4:L
49 4-A
.R

A rnA4n4AWXeu.
M AU

P.un

u1-r0aer uu-W,
fr
ia-u

m

vdiin may be cenditi'ena!, and ma,: be a~tered or amen~de, d
before the deci in on the merits. When persons sue or are
sued as representatives of a class, the court shall determine by
order whether and with respect to what claims, defenses, or
issues the action should be certified as a class action.
(A) An order certifying a class action must describe the class.
When a class is certified under subdivision (b)(3), the order must state when and how putative members (i) may
elect to be excluded from the class, and (ii) if the class is
certified only for settlement, may elect to be excluded
from any settlement approved by the court under subdivision (e). When a class is certified under subdivision
(b)(4), the order must state when, how, and under what
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conditions putative members may elect to be included in
the class; the conditions of inclusion may include a requirement that class members bear a fair share of litigation expenses incurred by the representative parties.
(B) An order under this subdivision may be [is] conditional,
An
and may be altered or amended before Medecisin
thGae
=-m

final judgment.

(2)(A) When ordering that an action be certified as a class action
under this rule, the court shall direct that appropriate notice be given to the class. The notice must concisely and
clearly describe the nature of the action, the claims, issues,
or defenses with respect to which the class has been certified, the right to elect to be excluded from a class certified
under subdivision (b)(3), the right to elect to be included
in a class certified under subdivision (b)(4), and the potential consequences of class membership. [A defendant may
be ordered to advance the expense of notifying a plaintiff
class if, under subdivision (b)(3)(E), the court finds a
strong probability that the plaintiff class will win on the
merits.]
(i) In any class action certified under subdivision (b)(1)
or (2), the court shall direct a means of notice calculated to reach a sufficient number of class members
to provide effective opportunity for challenges to the
class certification or representation and for supervision of class representatives and class counsel by
other class members.
(ii) In any class action maintained certified under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of
the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort[but
individual notice may be limited to a sampling of
class members if the cost of individual notice is excessive in relation to the generally small value of individual members' claims.1 The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the c"urt W4ll cXG:cude thn -mtmb0
f romn the-cnsg if the member- so requests by a -- c

fied date; (B) the judgment, whether fx.'orah1 o
n9t, VP'Al includeR All Memr who do noet reus
...
i.a.., ad-)
any member who does not request
exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
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(iii) In any class action certified under subdivision (b)(4),
the court shall direct a means of notice calculated to
accomplish the purposes of certification.
(3) Whether or not favorable to the class,
(A) The judgment in an action mai"tained certified as a class
action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b) (2), w.t.e-or-not
fa.vrAbl_ to the Glass, shall include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members of the class.,;
(B) The judgment in an action maintained certified as a class
action under subdivision (b)(3),wheter er not fx;'orab1o
t. th, GIMS, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2)(A)(ii)
was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and
whom the court finds to be members of the classand
(C) The judgment in an action certified as a class action
under subdivision (b)(4) shall include all those who
elected to be included in the class and who were not earlier dismissed from the class.
(4) When appropriate, (A) An action may be breught oi-r
Wneid certified as a class action (A) with respect to particular claims, defenses, or issues; or
a(B) a class may be divided into subclasse and A -1
trated as a Glass, and the previsions of thisrl sha4
then be,-construed and applied a o-dngl by or against
multiple classes or subclasses, which need not satisfy the
requirement of subdivision (a)(1).
(d) Orders in Conduct of Class Actions. in the-conduct of actions t@
...hich thi rule appl.. s, the c.u.t m make apprpriate -ordems;
(1) Before determining whether to certify a class the court may
decide a motion made by any party under Rules 12 or 56 if
the court concludes that decision will promote the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy and will not cause
undue delay.
(2) As a class action progresses, the court may make orders that:
(A) (1- determinei. the course of proceedings or
prescribehig measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the present__gatie-f evidence or
argument;
(B) (2) requireig, for the protection @ to protect the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action, that notice be dieogtd to some or all of-tho members of:
(i) refusal to certify a class;
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(ii) any step in the action; -e
(iii) the proposed extent of the judgment; - or of
(iv) the members' opportunity of the membGrs to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or to otherwise come into the action, or to be
excluded from or included in the class;
(C) (-3) imposeiag conditions on the representative parties,
class members, or oa intervenors;
(D) (4) requireing that the pleadings be amended to eliminate thefrem allegations as-to about representation of
absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly;
(E) (5 dealing with similar procedural matters.
(3)
e orders An order under subdivision (d)(2) may be combined with an order under Rule 16 and may be altered or
amended as may be degerable fro-m t.ime, to time.
(e) Dismissal or and Compromise.
(1) Before a certification determination is made under subdivision (c)(1) in an action in which persons sue for are suedi as
representatives of a class, court approval is required for any
dismissal, compromise, or amendment to delete class issues.
(2) An dsa& action certified as a class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court,
and notice of thG a proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs.
(3) A proposal to dismiss or compromise an action certified as a
class action may be referred to a magistrate judge or a person
specially appointed for an independent investigation and report to the court on the fairness of the proposed dismissal or
compromise. The expenses of the investigation and report
and the fees of a person specially appointed shall be paid by
the parties as directed by the court.
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying a request for
class action certification under this rule if application is made to it
within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the
court of appeals so orders.
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